Introduction

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Claude Lévi-Strauss is not a philosopher, but a social anthropologist.

Although prepared academically for a philosophical vocation, he has

committed himself to anthropology. His view toward philosophy, sub-

sequently, is somewhat ambiguous. In describing one of his most philo-

sophically oriented books ( The Savage Mind), he states that, despite the

possibility of formulating in it an indigenous philosophy, he was de-

termined not to set out upon this route. He seems quite convinced in

his determination not to enter philosophical realms; yet, since Lévi-

Straussian structuralism, at its core, is an epistemology and has already

produced an ethic, 1 it is doubtful that he can be considered to have

successfully extricated himself from this philosophical perspective. 2

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One overall problem forms the core of this observation. In Lévi-

Strauss, the basic opposition out of which all primitive logic is structured

is that between nature and culture. The bridge that logic forms between

these binary terms is the priority of the collective over the individual. 3

The question that Lévi-Strauss constantly sets before himself is how the

collective is ontologically prior to the individual.

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This problem has a long history. Its locus classicus is the debate that

takes place between Glaucon and Socrates in the second book of the

Republic. 4 The general question of the dialogue is "What is justice?"

Glaucon had maintained that the words justice and injustice have no

meaning, since individuality is ontologically prior to the collective. If

the "just" man and the "unjust" man were both provided with a talisman

that would render them invisible (the ring of Gyges), they would both take

and do whatever their (individual) natures urged upon them. Hence, for

Glaucon, individuals are intrinsically unrelated one to another, and

justice is, then, simply a conventional term, not a natural one. 5 The intrinsic nature of each particular man is to seize the advantage and to

take what he can without being punished. "Justice" applies to those con-

ventions that the weak have imposed upon the strong, to save themselves

from annihilation.

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Socrates formulates his reply to Glaucon's empiricism by eliciting agree-

ment from Glaucon that individuality within the state best appears in

the division of labor in each society. He intends Glaucon to admit that

intersubjectivity is as primary an ingredient of man's (individual) being

as is Glaucon's idea of an isolated ego. Socrates tries to show that we

speak of an individual and his "rights" only because we understand him

in the broader context of responsibilities. Hence, individuality in Soc-

rates' notion is founded upon the division of labor, itself resting upon

intersubjective exchanges. The collective, here, is ontologically prior to

the individual:

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. A state . . . arises, as I conceive, out of the needs of mankind; no

. one is self-sufficing, but all of us have many wants. Can any other

. origin of a state be imagined?

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. There can be no other.

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. Then, as we have many wants, and many persons are needed to sup-

. ply them, one takes a helper for one purpose and another for an-

. other; and when these partners and helpers are gathered together

. in one habituation the body of inhabitants is termed a State.

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. True, he said.

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. And they exchange with one another, and one gives, and another

. receives, under the idea that the exchange will be for their good.

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. Very true. 6

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Lévi-Strauss's position is similar to Plato's: in placing the collective over

the particular, he breaks with the tradition of individualism in French

philosophy running from Descartes to Sartre. The significance and

character of this break calls not only for a description of Lévi-Strauss's

accomplishment but also for critical interpretation.