Michael Walzer (3 March 1935) is one of America's leading political philosophers. He is a professor emeritus at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey and editor of Dissent, a left-wing quarterly of politics and culture. He has written on a wide range of topics, including just and unjust wars, nationalism, ethnicity, economic justice, social criticism, radicalism, tolerance, and political obligation. He is also a contributing editor to The New Republic and a member of the editorial board of Philosophy & Public Affairs. To date he has written 27 books and has published over 300 articles, essays, and book reviews. He is a member of several philosophical organizations including the American Philosophical Society.

Michael is the older brother of historian Judith Walzer Leavitt.

Walzer is usually identified as one of the leading proponents of the "Communitarian" position in political theory, along with Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Sandel. Like Sandel and MacIntyre, Walzer is not completely comfortable with this label. He has, however, long argued that political theory must be grounded in the traditions and culture of particular societies and opposed what he sees to be the excessive abstraction of political philosophy. His most important intellectual contributions include a revitalization of just war theory that insists on the importance of ethics in wartime while eschewing pacifism; the theory of "complex equality," which holds that the metric of just equality is not some single material or moral good, but rather that egalitarian justice demands that each good be distributed according to its social meaning, and that no good (like money or political power) be allowed to dominate or distort the distribution of goods in other spheres; and an argument that justice is primarily a moral standard within particular nations and societies, not one that can be developed in a universalized abstraction.

In April 2008, Walzer received the prestigious Spinoza Lens, a bi-annual prize for ethics in The Netherlands.

In Thick and Thin, Walzer extends this argument by posing the existence of two moral languages, one based on simplicity, the other on complexity. The latter, which he calls "thick," is rooted in local conditions and circumstances. It asks: what do I owe to those around me, those whose history, language, and culture are similar to mine? Thin morality, by contrast, is universal, but in applying to everyone, it also applies to no one in particular. Thin morality asks what unites me with people who do not share my company; extended to its furthest reaches, although Walzer does not extend the argument this way, it asks what obligations I have to animals or the physical environment.

Both kinds of moral language are important, but each, as one might expect from Walzer, has its own sphere. To summarize a complex argument simply, thick morality is domestic, while thin morality is international. We cannot tell the Chinese or the Poles how to provide health care, but we can respond when they demand freedom and truth. But we do have a moral obligation to think about how we can provide health care to our fellow citizens, for we share with them cultural and social resources that link our fates directly. Moral mistakes come about when we apply a thick morality where thinness is appropriate, by trying, for example, to impose our cultural values on those of a different culture. They can also occur when we apply too thin a morality in contexts that demand thickness, for then we fail to ask enough of the society that unites us.