Problems of fair division, equitable cost-sharing, division of a joint benefit, or the choice of a truly democratic voting rule are familiar subjects of dispute in technologically advanced democracies. This book provides a comprehensive and unified presentation of these technically heterogeneous subjects that are linked by common axioms.
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Fun parts: a classification of axioms in social choice thy and game thy; equivalence between IIA & strategyproof ness after restricting domain; how simple/sequential games can be imbedded in voting when fixing a voting rule. L: H61.25 .M677 1988
评分Fun parts: a classification of axioms in social choice thy and game thy; equivalence between IIA & strategyproof ness after restricting domain; how simple/sequential games can be imbedded in voting when fixing a voting rule. L: H61.25 .M677 1988
评分Fun parts: a classification of axioms in social choice thy and game thy; equivalence between IIA & strategyproof ness after restricting domain; how simple/sequential games can be imbedded in voting when fixing a voting rule. L: H61.25 .M677 1988
评分Fun parts: a classification of axioms in social choice thy and game thy; equivalence between IIA & strategyproof ness after restricting domain; how simple/sequential games can be imbedded in voting when fixing a voting rule. L: H61.25 .M677 1988
评分Fun parts: a classification of axioms in social choice thy and game thy; equivalence between IIA & strategyproof ness after restricting domain; how simple/sequential games can be imbedded in voting when fixing a voting rule. L: H61.25 .M677 1988
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