David A. Moss is the John G. McLean Professor at Harvard Business School, where he teaches in the business, government and international economy area. Professor Moss's research focuses on economic policy and especially the government's role as a risk manager. He has published three books on these subjects: Socializing Security: Progressive-Era Economists and the Origins of American Social Policy (1996), When All Else Fails: Government as the Ultimate Risk Manager (2002) and A Concise Guide to Macroeconomics: What Managers, Executives, and Students Need to Know (2007). Professor Moss is the founder of the Tobin Project, a non-profit research organization, and a member of the National Academy of Social Insurance. Recent honors include the Robert F. Greenhill Award, the Editors' Prize from the American Bankruptcy Law Journal, the Student Association Faculty Award for outstanding teaching at the Harvard Business School and the American Risk and Insurance Association's Annual Kulp-Wright Book Award for the 'most influential text published on the economics of risk management and insurance'. He received his PhD from Yale University in 1992.

One of the most important functions of government--risk management--is one of the least well understood. Moving beyond the most familiar public functions--spending, taxation, and regulation--"When All Else Fails" spotlights the government's pivotal role as a risk manager. It reveals, as never before, the nature and extent of this governmental function, which touches almost every aspect of economic life. In policies as diverse as limited liability, deposit insurance, Social Security, and federal disaster relief, American lawmakers have managed a wide array of private-sector risks, transforming both the government and countless private actors into insurers of last resort. Drawing on history and economic theory, David Moss investigates these risk-management policies, focusing in particular on the original logic of their enactment. The nation's lawmakers, he finds, have long believed that pervasive imperfections in private markets for risk necessitate a substantial government role. It remains puzzling, though, why such a large number of the resulting policies have proven so popular in a country famous for its anti-statism. Moss suggests that the answer may lie in the nature of the policies themselves, since publicly mandated risk shifting often requires little in the way of invasive bureaucracy. Well suited to a society suspicious of government activism, public risk management has emerged as a critical form of government intervention in the United States.