Political Power and Corporate Control 在线电子书 图书标签: 比较政治经济学 比较政治 政治经济学 政治学 英文原版 经济学 经济 比较政治,政治学,公司治理
发表于2024-12-23
Political Power and Corporate Control 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2024
公司治理的政治理论里目前集大成之作,理论是经典的比较政治学的框架,跨学科、跨国比较的实证研究也很细致。Peter Gourevitch 在我看来是在世政治学家里真正有创造力的少数几个之一
评分古勒维奇老爷子典型风格,精细分类,大量变量,随心所欲组合成炫目模型,政治经济社会一把抓,不说则已一说就要说到底让别人无话可说(终于体会到为嘛另外看的两本回应之作都那么短了,没多少缝隙了啊)。不过对公司治理结构这话题不熟也不太感兴趣,翻翻以后当参考算了= =
评分政治(主体偏好+政治制度)—政策(少数股东保护+经济协调度)—公司治理(集中持股/分散持股)。法律和经济学者纠结何种治理规则才是最有效率的。然而,知道了又如何呢?治理规则最终还是靠政治过程生成。方法和结论都在意料之外,但回味起来政治解释似乎是最合理的。这才是真正的political science and law ????
评分OMG
评分公司治理的政治理论里目前集大成之作,理论是经典的比较政治学的框架,跨学科、跨国比较的实证研究也很细致。Peter Gourevitch 在我看来是在世政治学家里真正有创造力的少数几个之一
Peter Gourevitch is a Harvard University trained political scientist with expertise in international relations and comparative politics. In 2005-06, he was a visiting fellow at the Russell Sage Foundation where he worked on a book comparing managerial oversight with institutional investors from four countries. Concurrently, he was a fellow at The John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation. Gourevitch is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and chairs its selection committee for International Affairs Fellowships. He is also a past president of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs and is currently a Professor of Political Science at the Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies at the University of California, San Diego.
James Shinn is Chairman of Teneo Intelligence, Lecturer at Princeton University and regular contributor to Institutional Investor magazine on political risk. In addition to his role at Teneo, Dr. Shinn advises several technology firms.
Why does corporate governance - front page news with the collapse of Enron, WorldCom, and Parmalat - vary so dramatically around the world? This book explains how politics shapes corporate governance - how managers, shareholders, and workers jockey for advantage in setting the rules by which companies are run, and for whom they are run. It combines a clear theoretical model on this political interaction, with statistical evidence from thirty-nine countries of Europe, Asia, Africa, and North and South America and detailed narratives of country cases. This book differs sharply from most treatments by explaining differences in minority shareholder protections and ownership concentration among countries in terms of the interaction of economic preferences and political institutions. It explores in particular the crucial role of pension plans and financial intermediaries in shaping political preferences for different rules of corporate governance. The countries examined sort into two distinct groups: diffuse shareholding by external investors who pick a board that monitors the managers, and concentrated blockholding by insiders who monitor managers directly. Examining the political coalitions that form among or across management, owners, and workers, the authors find that certain coalitions encourage policies that promote diffuse shareholding, while other coalitions yield blockholding-oriented policies. Political institutions influence the probability of one coalition defeating another.
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Political Power and Corporate Control 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2024