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Hawkins, Darren G. (EDT)/ Lake, David A. (EDT)/ Nielson, Daniel L. (EDT)/ Tierney, Michael J. (EDT) 作者

Cambridge University Press

译者

2006-10-30 出版日期

426 页数

USD 45.99 价格

Paperback

丛书系列

9780521680462 图书编码

Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 在线电子书图书标签: 国际政治经济学国际制度 IO CIR_IPE_SampleReadingList

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Delegation and Agency in International Organizations 在线电子书 epub 下载 mobi 下载 pdf 下载 txt 下载 2024

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Why do states delegate certain tasks and responsibilities to international organizations rather than acting unilaterally or cooperating directly? Furthermore, to what extent do states continue to control IOs once authority has been delegated? Examining a variety of different institutions including the World Trade Organization, the United Nations and the European Commission, this book explores the different methods that states employ to ensure their interests are being served, and identifies the problems involved with monitoring and managing IOs. The contributors suggest that it is not inherently more difficult to design effective delegation mechanisms at international level than at domestic level and, drawing on principal-agent theory, help explain the variations that exist in the extent to which states are willing to delegate to IOs. They argue that IOs are neither all evil nor all virtuous, but are better understood as bureaucracies that can be controlled to varying degrees by their political masters.

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