This volume analyzes the function of informal institutions in Latin America and how they support or weaken democratic governance. Drawing from a wide range of examples—including the Mexican dedazo, clientelism in Brazil, legislative "ghost coalitions" in Ecuador, and elite power-sharing in Chile—the contributors examine how informal rules shape the performance of state and democratic institutions, offering fresh and timely insights into contemporary problems of governability, "unrule of law," and the absence of effective representation, participation, and accountability in Latin America.
The editors present this analysis within a fourfold conceptual framework: complementary institutions, which fill gaps in formal rules or enhance their efficacy; accommodative informal institutions, which blunt the effects of dysfunctional formal institutions; competing informal institutions, which directly subvert the formal rules; and substitutive informal institutions, which replace ineffective formal institutions.
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An apposite typology dealing with the relationship between formal and informal institutions, substantive chapters are generally solid. Could be better if the question of when to focus on informal institutions is addressed.
评分Levitsky 那篇理論框架是Informal institution 研究必讀瞭。其它翻翻感興趣的就好。
评分Levitsky 那篇理論框架是Informal institution 研究必讀瞭。其它翻翻感興趣的就好。
评分An apposite typology dealing with the relationship between formal and informal institutions, substantive chapters are generally solid. Could be better if the question of when to focus on informal institutions is addressed.
评分Helmke和Levitsky對四種非正式製度種類的劃分是開創性的，但正如書中其他作者所說的那樣，某一種特定的現象/製度並不一定隻屬於這四種中的其中一種。比如Clientelism，兩位編者都傾嚮於認為它對民主是有害的，是競爭性的非正式製度，但事實上clientelism在洪都拉斯就錶現齣瞭替代性的特徵，它代替瞭正式製度（國會）發揮瞭地方利益代錶性的功能，使得政治傢即使在正式製度無法約束他們的時候也要積極迴應選民訴求，為地方利益服務。
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