Despite the volatility and unpredictability North Korea has come to symbolise in international diplomacy and security issues, it represents only half of the potential danger on the Korean peninsula. In a notable departure from its past role as guarantor of stability on the Korean peninsula, the United States has, under the Bush administration, come to be regarded as, at best, an obstacle to peace and security, and at worst a potential trigger for hostility. The most immediate result of this shift on the Korean peninsula has been the U.S. failure to undertake an effective policy formulation process, leaving it merely reacting to challenges from the North Korean regime. Without a constructive U.S. policy there is little hope of advancing discussions or resolving the issues of North Korea's nuclear programme. Fundamental to understanding North Korea's endgame is realising that its nuclear weapons programme, while menacing, is unlikely to be used offensively without major provocation; it functions as a tool of diplomacy to ensure the survival of the regime. The author argues that, working closely with South Korea, the U.S. must undertake constructive engagement. The steadfast unwillingness to engage with North Korea only provides more fodder for the regime to stall any action on its part and allowing it to present the U.S. as the aggressor. By adopting a belligerent stance, the Bush administration is playing along with Pyongyang's endgame.