Table of Contents
Introduction
0.1. What is Consciousness?
0.2. The Significance of Consciousness
0.3. The Hard Problem of Consciousness
0.4. Putting Consciousness First
0.5. An Overview of this Book
0.6. Chapter Summaries
PART I
1. Representation
1.1. Representationalism
1.2. Unconscious Mental Representation
1.3. Grounding Representation in Consciousness
1.4. Grounding Thought in Consciousness
1.5. Grounding Epistemic Justification in Consciousness
2. Perception
2.1. Blindsight
2.2. Concepts of Consciousness
2.3. Presentational Force
2.4. Skeptical Scenarios
2.5. Duplication Scenarios
2.6. Conclusions
3. Cognition
3.1. The Epistemic Role of Belief
3.2. Beliefs and Subdoxastic States
3.3. Inferential Integration
3.4. Conscious Accessibility
3.5. The Cognitive Experience of Judgment
3.6. Conclusions
4. Introspection
4.1. The Simple Theory of Introspection
4.2. The Reliability Challenge
4.3. Rationality and Self-Knowledge
4.4. The Scope Question
4.5. The Role of Conscious Judgment
4.6. Conclusions
5. Mentalism
5.1. Evidentialism
5.2. Mentalism
5.3. Phenomenal Mentalism
5.4. The Phenomenal Conception of Evidence
5.5. The Explanatory Challenge
PART II
6. Accessibilism
6.1. What is Accessibilism?
6.2. Explaining Accessibilism
6.3. Clairvoyance and Super-Blindsight
6.4. The New Evil Demon Problem
6.5. Answering the Explanatory Challenge
7. Reflection
7.1. Justification and Reflection
7.2. An Argument from Reflection
7.3. The Over-Intellectualization Problem
7.4. The Regress Problem
7.5. The Empirical Problem
7.6. The Value Problem
7.7. Conclusions
8. Epistemic Akrasia
8.1. What is Epistemic Akrasia?
8.2. An Argument from Epistemic Akrasia
8.3. Moore's Paradox
8.4. Knowledge as the Aim of Belief
8.5. Justification and Reflection
9. Higher-Order Evidence
9.1. A Puzzle About Epistemic Akrasia
9.2. Solving the Puzzle
9.3. The Certainty Argument
9.4. Ideally Rational Agents
9.5. Rational Dilemmas
9.6. Epistemic Idealization
10. Luminosity
10.1. Luminosity Defined
10.2. The Problem of the Speckled Hen
10.3. The Anti-Luminosity Argument
10.4. Epistemic Iteration Principles
10.5. The Puzzle of the Unmarked Clock
10.6. What's at Stake?
11. Conclusion
11.1. Phenomenal Conservatism
11.2. Seemings
11.3. Problems about Evidence
11.4. Problems about Evidential Support
11.5. Phenomenal Accessibilism
11.6. Conclusions
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