No European nation has been fought over more savagely or<br > more frequently than Poland， and no European people has a<br > stronger sense of nationhood than the Poles. As William E. Schau-<br > fele， Jr. a former U.S. Ambassador to Poland， writes in the first<br > article in this section， "Poland has had moments of glory and trag-<br > edy， of empire and obliteration， of freedom and occupation， of in-<br > dependence and partition， but the Polish nation has never lost its<br > identity or its vigor."<br > Certainly， Polish nationalism played a crucial part in the<br >emergence of an independent union that， with 10 million mem-<br >bers， could justifiably claim to have supplanted the Polish Com-<br >munist Party as the voice of the people. Popular risings had<br >occurred in Poland in 1956， 1970， and 1976， but all were quickly<br >suppressed by the government， who avoided prolonged tension by<br >rescinding price increases， thus， ironically， preparing the ground<br >for the economic crisis that brought political discontent to a head<br >in 1980. By the time Lech Walesa， in mid-1980， began the show<br >of quiet， nonviolent resistance in a Gdansk shipyard， all sectors<br >of Polish society excepting the ruling hierarchy were ready to act<br >in concert and did so with a conviction that made Solidarity and<br >Walesa seemingly invincible. Another factor in the rise of Polish<br >nationalism was the election of Karol Wojtyla to the Papacy in<br >1978. Now that the Catholic Church， long the defender of Polish<br >liberties， had a Polish leader， it could not help but seem to many<br >workers that God was on their side. But the discontent had other，<br >nonspiritual causes. Inflation， an insupportable national debt， and<br >a decade of corrupt， inefficient management had created the condi-<br >tions for revolution.<br >