Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2024


Political Determinants of Corporate Governance

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Mark J. Roe 作者
Oxford University Press
译者
2002-12-5 出版日期
248 页数
USD 125.00 价格
Hardcover
丛书系列
9780199240746 图书编码

Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 图书标签: 公司治理与证券市场  经济  法律  must  Governance  Corporate   


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Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 epub 下载 mobi 下载 pdf 下载 txt 下载 2024

Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 epub 下载 mobi 下载 pdf 下载 txt 下载 2024

Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2024



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和VoC框架截然相反,本书认为政治制度保持经济活动所需要的社会和平度,是决定资本主义国家企业结构和经济制度差异的主要变量。在有社会民主传统的西欧北欧国家,联盟执政和近似法团主义的国家通过增强劳工组织和博弈能力来维持社会和平,此政治气候下高管们倾向于缓慢扩大生产以维持就业,对冒险创新态度保守,拒绝随便裁员,故代理人成本激增,股东不得不组成较大的控股联盟,集中股权力量监督高管,造成资本市场较不发达。美国则相反,历史上较少阶级冲突和左翼等催生社民制度的因素,单名制下劳工组织博弈能力低下,故而企业控股较分散,上市多,股东和高管利益聚合多,资本和要素市场在分配资源上作用大。数据表明政治左右与控股集中度分布形态一致,越左越集中。也可理解为政治催生特殊寻租行为,脱离政治空谈企业法等技术因素则缺少宏观意义。

评分

和VoC框架截然相反,本书认为政治制度保持经济活动所需要的社会和平度,是决定资本主义国家企业结构和经济制度差异的主要变量。在有社会民主传统的西欧北欧国家,联盟执政和近似法团主义的国家通过增强劳工组织和博弈能力来维持社会和平,此政治气候下高管们倾向于缓慢扩大生产以维持就业,对冒险创新态度保守,拒绝随便裁员,故代理人成本激增,股东不得不组成较大的控股联盟,集中股权力量监督高管,造成资本市场较不发达。美国则相反,历史上较少阶级冲突和左翼等催生社民制度的因素,单名制下劳工组织博弈能力低下,故而企业控股较分散,上市多,股东和高管利益聚合多,资本和要素市场在分配资源上作用大。数据表明政治左右与控股集中度分布形态一致,越左越集中。也可理解为政治催生特殊寻租行为,脱离政治空谈企业法等技术因素则缺少宏观意义。

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怎么读出了卡尔波兰尼的基调,拿来对冲一下LLSV和Kraakman还挺不错的。

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怎么读出了卡尔波兰尼的基调,拿来对冲一下LLSV和Kraakman还挺不错的。

评分

和VoC框架截然相反,本书认为政治制度保持经济活动所需要的社会和平度,是决定资本主义国家企业结构和经济制度差异的主要变量。在有社会民主传统的西欧北欧国家,联盟执政和近似法团主义的国家通过增强劳工组织和博弈能力来维持社会和平,此政治气候下高管们倾向于缓慢扩大生产以维持就业,对冒险创新态度保守,拒绝随便裁员,故代理人成本激增,股东不得不组成较大的控股联盟,集中股权力量监督高管,造成资本市场较不发达。美国则相反,历史上较少阶级冲突和左翼等催生社民制度的因素,单名制下劳工组织博弈能力低下,故而企业控股较分散,上市多,股东和高管利益聚合多,资本和要素市场在分配资源上作用大。数据表明政治左右与控股集中度分布形态一致,越左越集中。也可理解为政治催生特殊寻租行为,脱离政治空谈企业法等技术因素则缺少宏观意义。

Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 著者简介

Mark J. Roe is Berg Professor Law at the Harvard Law School. He has previously held positions at Columbia University School of Law; University of Pennsylvania School of Law; and Rutgers University School of Law. His publications include Corporate Reorganization and Bankruptcy: Legal and Financial Materials (Foundation Press, 2000) and Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate Finance (Princeton University Press, 1994).


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Political Determinants of Corporate Governance 在线电子书 图书描述

Before a nation can produce, it must achieve social peace. That social peace has been reached in different nations by differing means, some of which have then been embedded in business firms, in corporate ownership patterns, and in corporate governance structures. The large publicly held, diffusely owned firm dominates business in the United States despite its infirmities, namely the frequently fragile relations between stockholders and managers. But in other economically advanced nations, ownership is not diffuse but concentrated. It is concentrated in no small measure because the delicate threads that tie managers to shareholders in the public firm fray easily in common political environments, such as those in the continental European social democracies. Social democracies press managers to stabilize employment, to forego some profit-maximizing risks with the firm, and to use up capital in place rather than to downsize when markets no longer are aligned with the firm's production capabilities. Since managers must have discretion in the public firm, how they use that discretion is crucial to stockholders, and social democratic pressures induce managers to stray farther than otherwise from their shareholders' profit-maximizing goals. Moreover, the means that align managers with diffuse stockholders in the United States-incentive compensation, hostile takeovers, and strong shareholder-wealth maximization norms-are weaker and sometimes denigrated in continental social democracies. Hence, public firms there have higher managerial agency costs, and large-block shareholding has persisted as shareholders' best remaining way to control those costs. Social democracies may enhance total social welfare, but if they do, they do so with fewer public firms than less socially responsive nations. The author therefore uncovers not only a political explanation for ownership concentration in Europe, but also a crucial political prerequisite to the rise of the public firm in the United States, namely the weakness of social democratic pressures on the American business firm.

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