PHILOSOPHICAL MEDITATIONS ON ZEN BUDDHISM. By Dale S.

WrightC. ambridge,G reatB ritain:C ambridgeU niversityP ress,1 998. xv +227 pp.

In a workb rimmingw ith unobtrusivee ruditiona nd centeredo n the figureo f Huang

Po (d. 850), Dale Wright offers a seasoned account of a topic that is still very much

in need of clarificationn, amely,t he roleso f language,c onceptualityt,e xtualityi,n terpretation,

a nd historicald evelopmenti n Zen Buddhism.S ome recentc riticst end to

see Zen as incoherento r even hypocriticali n that this "speciatl ransmissiono utside

the sutras, not dependent on language and texts, pointing directly to mind" (quoted,

p. 64) in reality developed complex and varied textual and ritual traditions from

Buddhist-Christian Studies 21 (2001). ? by University of Hawai'i Press. All rights reserved.

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which the supposedly pure enlightenment experience cannot be siphoned out.

Wright argues that the critics themselves are often naive, giving an inverted reflection

of the naiveteo f earliers cholarss uch as John Blofeld,w ho saw Zen as centered

on an ineffableS upremeE xperienceq, uitei ndependento f the languageu sedt o point

to it. Nonetheless,W righth imselfi s in basica greemenwt ith the criticsa nd in radical

opposition to Blofeld (and to D. T. Suzuki). But he points out that the early Chinese

Zen masters speak in many voices, often anticipating the most sophisticated

insightso f theirc ritics.W right's tylei s veryu nliket hat of BernardF aureb, eings low,

serene,r eflectives, crupulous,a nd imbuedw ith the deepestr espectf or the Zen tradition.

Yeth is thought rejoinsF aure'as t many points.

The thrusto f Wright'sa rgumenti s to demystifyZ en enlightenmentb y reinserting

it in its varied linguistic, social, institutional, and historical contexts. He gives a

realistica nd holistic accounto f what Zen experiencem ust have been like for disciples

of HuangP o (pp. 187-192). His stresso n the linguisticalityo f all experiencec ertainly

illuminates the texture of Huang Po's world. But I am left wondering if there

is not anothera specto f Zen that is missedh ere.M odernp hilosophersh ave derived

much insightf romt he realizationth at thoughta nd perceptiona red eeplye mbedded

in language. But I do not know that anyone has proven that there can never be a

thinking or perception that is independent of language. Even the supposedly pantextualist

Derrida states somewhere that he does not exclude the possibility of nonlinguistict

hought. In most fieldso f inquiryt his abstruseq uestionm akesn o practical

difference,b ut in the case of Zen it is of cruciali mport.T he presuppositiono f

universalli nguisticalitye,s peciallyif it hardensi nto a dogma,m ay blocka ccesst o the

core of Zen experience.

Wrighta rguest hat thoughs ome Zen masterss oughtp relinguisticim mediacyt, he

majorityw ere deeplya wareo f the inseparabilityo f experiencea nd the languagei n

which it is grasped.B ut could it not be that prelinguisticim mediacyw as so much

takenf or grantedi n Zen that the masterss carcelyn eededt o insisto n it?W rights ays

that enlightenmenti tself is a linguistice vent,s ince it is often occasionedb y a verbal

statementa nd given immediatee xpressioni n anotherv erbals tatement.B ut to recognizet

he indispensabilitoyf languagef or conveyinge xperienceis not necessarilyto

imply that the experiencei tself is dependento n languageA. lthougha certainp oem

of Huang Po "strivesto make its anti-textualp oint, the masterm ust enter into the

textual world to do so, thus abandoning the position of 'no dependence on texts"'

(p. 22). Is it reallyn ecessaryt o see a contradictionh ere, given that, as Wrighth imself

points out, "no unanimity on the meaning of the mandate against 'words and

letters'e xisted"( p. 26)? Let us supposet hat the point is nonattachment o textsa nd

a realizationo f the intrinsici ndependenceo f enlightenmentf rom the limited perspectiveso

f textuality,l anguage,a nd conceptualt hought.T his is quite compatible

with intensive use of texts in practice.

Blofeld explains that texts were useful to the learner but cast aside when enlightenmentw

as reachedW. righta rguest hat the enlightenede xperiencem ust "continue

to hold within it, and to be supplementedb y, the influencea nd outcomeo f reading"

(p. 23). Blofeld might reply that if one learning to swim uses an inflated tube, then

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castsi t away,t he swimmingi s no longeri n any way supplementedb y the tube, and

to reintroducet he tube would be an absurd irrelevance.B ut why then, Wright

objects, did enlightened masters continue to read? One might reply that they read

without attachment to or dependence on their reading. Wright suggests that the

doctrineo f dependentc o-originatione ntailst hat enlightenmenti s alwaysd ependent

on the textuala nd historicalf actorst hat occasioni t. To be sure,o ne might reply,b ut

only in the sense that emptinessc an be seen as dependento n the particularb asiso f

which it is the emptiness.T o attaine nlightenmenti s to be releasedf rom the attachments

and delusionst hat tie us to the samsaricr ealma nd in this sense to breakt he

chain of dependent co-arising. From the space of freedom thus attained one revisits

the realmo f dependentc o-originationa nd seesi t in its emptinessZ. en enlightenment

is a realizationo f emptinessi n connectionw ith a certainc oncretep atho r careera nd

continues to be enacted in relation to that path. The enlightened scholar does not

ceaset o be a scholarb ut realizesth e emptinesso f his learninga nd has a freedr elationship

to it. Rereadingth e sutrasn ow becomesa way of reapingt he harvesto f enlightened

vision.

Wrightg ivesa fine accounto f enlightenmenta s awarenesos f dependentc o-origination,

which is identicalw ith awarenesso f emptiness,a ccordingt o Madhyamaka

logic. But he is averse to any suggestion that emptiness is something ultimate, invariable,

or timeless.T herea ref our rhetoricasl trategiesin Zen dialogues-strangeness,

direct pointing, silence, and disruption-all of which express the awakened state of

"one who no longer seeks solid ground, who realized that all things and situations

are supported,n ot by firm grounda nd solid self-natureb, ut ratherb y shiftinga nd

contingent relations"( p. 100). Enlightenmenth as not to do with some precious

inners ubjectivee cstasyb ut with co-respondingt o what is going on in the here-andnow

situation, grasped in its emptiness. Zen rhetoric, including the unnerving

silences,i s "designedto disorientateo ne'sr elationt o everything"(p 97). It breakst he

hold of substantialisdt elusion,e nshrinedi n the habitualf abricationos f language,s o

as to awaken one to emptiness, an awakening that brings joyful freedom based on

intelligent insight into the way things really are. That means that Zen enlightenment

is fully aware of its concrete context, and that "beyond the Zen rhetoric of timelessness,

we find historicalc ontextualizationto be centralt o their self-understanding"

(p. 106).

But can this rhetorico f timelessnessr eallyb e writteno ff as a red herring?E veni f

insighti nto the textureo f one'sh istoricalh erea nd now is parto f enlighteneda wareness,

this does not necessarilya lign Zen with the contemporaryp hilosophicald octrine

of universal historicity. Wright points out that Zen disciples aspire to "go

beyond"t heirm aster:" Pai-chang''tsr ansmissioonf mind't o HuangP o will haveb een

effectivea nd completeo nly at the point that Huang Po has transcendedP ai-chang's

'mind'i n the act of creatively'g oingb eyond'i t" (p.1 39). This, he claims,i ntroduces

pluralismh, istoricitya, nd individualc reativityin to the hearto f Zen awakeninga, nd

disqualifies" essentialistn"o tions of an unvaryinge xperience.B ut perhapst his is a

case of havingt o run very fast to stay in the same place. Perhapst he "samenesso"f

what the Zen mastersd iscoveri s somethingl ike the "samenesso"f love, as celebrated

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by the poets,a samenesst hatp romptsa n evern ew varietyo f poetici nvention.I n that

case, without harpingo n the identityo f the experiencei n a literal-mindedfa shion,

we could still maintain that Zen awakening concerns a single reality that is not in

itself subject to historical change. To give a homelier analogy: a teacher of English

might surpassh is predecessorisn developingn ew and more effectivem ethods,b ut

the end result,t he transmissiono f competencei n the Englishl anguage,r emainst he

same.

Wright sees mind-to-mind transmissiona s a mythicala ccount of the creative

interactiono f mastersa nd disciples,p romptedb y concernsw ith institutionall egitimation:

"It may be that, insteado f 'mind-to-mindt ransmissiong' iving rise to the

recording of historical lineage, it was actually the other way round" (p. 141). But

againI wonderi f Huang Po'ss tatement," Mindi s transmittedw ith Mind and these

Mindsd o not differ"r eallyr eferst o "ane xactr eplicao f the Buddha''sa wakening"(p' .

142); the word "replica"is surelyi napplicablet o "awakeningu"n der any circumstances.

W hy not read" do not differ"a s meaning" don ot fundamentallyo r essentially

differ"?W right addressest his possibility,a lreadyf ound in the Zen sources:

"Whilet he substanceo r essenceo f mind couldb e saidt o be identicalb etweene qually

enlightenedm asterst, he way this 'awakeningf'u nctionsi n the worldm ight differs ignificantly"(

p. 142). He arguest hat such a differentiationa nd hierarchyo f substance

and function is discreditedi n Madhyamakat hought as well as in contemporary

deconstructivep hilosophy.B ut one could still be certaint hat an identicalr ealityi s

transmittede, ven if one could not pretendt o distilli t in a pure form from the variety

of its realizationsI.n some sensea piece of music is substantiallyid enticald espite

the infinite varietyo f individualp erformancesW. hat is to preventZ en awakening

havingt his degreeo f substantiaild entity?I n this sense, "to maintaina n essencef or

enlightenmenti n the fact of its changinga ppearancess"e emsq uite defensible.I do

not see that it "inevitablyp ushes the elusive' essenceo f enlightenment'o ut of the

finitew orldi nto a transcendenrt ealma boutw hich nothingc an be said becauseo ne

encounterso nly its appearances("p . 145). The essenceo bviouslye xistsi n all its realizations(

which only a Platonistw ould call its "appearances"a)s, the music existsi n

all its performancess,o that therei s no call to formulatei t in some abstracte xtraperformativesp

ace.W e could even claimt hat koan literaturer, ightlyi nterpretedh, as

something of the objectivity of a musical score, helping its student find the way to

the awakeningi t reflectsT. he insistenceo n identityi n the Zen texts is perhapso nly

a way of sayingt hat Zen discoversa realitya nd does not merelyi nventi t. To say that

Zen awakeningis "bestc onceived,n ot as a timeless,a historicael ssence,b ut as a continuallye

volving,h istoricalr ealizationo f successiveg enerationsh' ighesta spirations"

(p. 144) may not do phenomenologicajlu sticet o contemplativee xperiencew, hose

discoveriesa re "ever-anciente,v er-new,"a nd do seem to claim an independenceo f

languagea nd history.F or Wright,t he experienceo f emptinesse ntails" denialo f all

claimst o truth and absolutenessi,n cludingi ts own claim to know somethingu ltimately

truthful about all claims" (p. 197). Again, I wonder if Zen statements to the

effectt hat nothing is "known"o r "obtained"in enlightenmentr eallyu nderminet he

(nonconceptual) truth and ultimacy of the experience. Perhaps they serve only as

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phenomenologicali ndicators of the non-graspabilityo f enlightened insight (as

expoundedb y Wright,p p. 199-200), without the implicationso f radicale pistemological

scepticism that the phrase "denial of all claims to truth" suggests.

Wrightc ontestst he use of "enlightenmenta"s the standardE nglisht erm for the

Zen experiencep, ointingo ut that therei s no exacte quivalentf or it in HuangP o and

suggestingt hat it attemptst o graftt he Zen worldo nto the EuropeanE nlightenment

(p. 182). This is far-fetched;" enlightenmenti"s a fairlys traightforwartdr anslation

of Japaneses atori.I t is also far-fetchedt o characterizteh e claim that Zen perceives

"thingsa s they are"a s a "rhetoricafilg ured rawnf romE uropeanr ationalism("p . 182),

ultimatelyd erivingf rom Descartesu' se of meditationt o purifyt he mind so as to see

clearly and without prejudice. The obvious source of the expression is Sanskrit

tathata( thusness,s uchness),w hich D. T. Suzukia ssociatesw ith the homelyJ apanese

expressionsk ono-mamaa nd sono-mama", justa s it is." I noticed some slight inaccuraciesi

n Wright'sc ritiqueo f Blofeld.N ote 22 on page 186 reads:" The Zen master

is thought 'to clothe invisible Reality in the garments of the religion then and there

prevailing'( Blofeld, TheZ en Teachingo f Hui Hai, p. 18)." In fact, in the passage

quoted Blofelds ayst he oppositeo f this: he speakso f "threea lternatives-to remain

silent . . .; to clothe invisible Reality. . .; or to point the way by systematically

demolishinga ll the categorieso f thought.. ... It is this last approachw hich gaver ise

to ... Zen."A gain,W rights ayst hat Blofelds eesE nlightenmenat s "anU ltimateP erfection

lying beyond the realmo f ever-changingfo rms"( p. 184), but the reference

in Blofeld'st ext is to the objecto f PureL andf aith.

A mere review is not the place to resolve the issues dealt with in Dale Wright's

profoundly attentive study of a classic moment in Zen history. As we continue to

strugglew ith these issues,h is book will remaina landmarkp oint of reference.

Joseph S. O'Leary

SophiaU niversityT, okyo