This book defends an evaluative theory of emotion that assigns emotion a role of its own in the justification of action. In contrast to both the Cartesian picture of emotions as sensations, and the currently popular judgmentalist' account of them in terms of evaluative judgments, emotions are analysed as states of object-directed effect, with evaluative propositional content possibly falling short of belief, and held in mind by generalized comfort or discomfort.
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