This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author confronts the major objections to this theory, arguing that contrary to what has often been assumed, the theory does have the resources to explain moral disagreements and to offer a reasonable approach to resolving some of them. The major alternative theories, including subjectivism, nihilism, and reductionism, are shown to face decisive objections.
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seemings everywhere...so no seemings with cognitive phenomenology, no prima facie justification?????
评分seemings everywhere...so no seemings with cognitive phenomenology, no prima facie justification?????
评分seemings everywhere...so no seemings with cognitive phenomenology, no prima facie justification?????
评分seemings everywhere...so no seemings with cognitive phenomenology, no prima facie justification?????
评分seemings everywhere...so no seemings with cognitive phenomenology, no prima facie justification?????
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