This book explains how presidents achieve market-oriented reforms in a contentious political environment. Using the case study of Ecuador, where regional and ethnic divisions combined with lenient electoral institutions to contribute to severe legislative fragmentation and pervasive executive-legislative conflict, Acosta demonstrates how presidents were able to assemble significant policy changes in Congress without exclusively relying on constitutional decree authority. Acosta offers a systematic way of thinking about how informal institutions interact with formal ones to affect policy behavior by both a president and legislator. Utilizing legislative productivity rates, roll call votes, cabinet composition, legislative career paths, public opinion surveys, as well as insights from congressional hearings, media archives, and dozens of interviews with policy makers in Ecuador, Acosta's far-reaching conclusions will be of interest to Political Scientists and scholars of Latin America.
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讀後感
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