To be responsible for their acts, agents must both perform those acts voluntarily and in some sense know what they are doing. Of these requirements, the voluntariness condition has been much discussed, but the epistemic condition has received far less attention. In Who Knew? George Sher seeks to rectify that imbalance. The book is divided in two halves, the first of which criticizes a popular but inadequate way of understanding the epistemic condition, while the second seeks to develop a more adequate alternative. It is often assumed that agents are responsible only for what they are aware of doing or bringing about--that their responsibility extends only as far as the searchlight of their consciousness. The book criticizes this "searchlight view" on two main grounds: first, that it is inconsistent with our attributions of responsibility to a broad range of agents who should but do not realize that they are acting wrongly or foolishly, and, second, that the view is not independently defensible.
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some really interesting movements in the epistemic dimension of moral responsibility
评分some really interesting movements in the epistemic dimension of moral responsibility
评分some really interesting movements in the epistemic dimension of moral responsibility
评分写了一学期论文，现在回头去看发现当时很多点还是没get到。如果想了解责任认知条件的能力主义立场，是要看的书。把问题所涉及的许多方面都讨论到了，但Sher对一些反驳的回应不充分，所以看这本书之外还要看一些其他东西。
评分写了一学期论文，现在回头去看发现当时很多点还是没get到。如果想了解责任认知条件的能力主义立场，是要看的书。把问题所涉及的许多方面都讨论到了，但Sher对一些反驳的回应不充分，所以看这本书之外还要看一些其他东西。
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