Quiet Politics and Business Power 在线电子书 图书标签: 比较政治 日本政治 社会 比较政治经济学 政治经济学 影像 公共政策 ComparativePolitics
发表于2025-04-09
Quiet Politics and Business Power 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2025
interesting~
评分作者在日本的协助者好像是樋渡展洋教授吧。不过此书出版之后,好像在日本近乎没有什么反响。我自己也觉得作者说的故事甚为可疑。所谓透明度较低的,不可见的政治决定,这也并非民主国家的大新闻,或者说不是什么政治学的新鲜事。用此论及民主国家的自主性或者民主政治与公共政策的问题,似乎也没有大的启发。不过作者的颜值还是蛮高的
评分interesting~
评分作者在日本的协助者好像是樋渡展洋教授吧。不过此书出版之后,好像在日本近乎没有什么反响。我自己也觉得作者说的故事甚为可疑。所谓透明度较低的,不可见的政治决定,这也并非民主国家的大新闻,或者说不是什么政治学的新鲜事。用此论及民主国家的自主性或者民主政治与公共政策的问题,似乎也没有大的启发。不过作者的颜值还是蛮高的
评分作者在日本的协助者好像是樋渡展洋教授吧。不过此书出版之后,好像在日本近乎没有什么反响。我自己也觉得作者说的故事甚为可疑。所谓透明度较低的,不可见的政治决定,这也并非民主国家的大新闻,或者说不是什么政治学的新鲜事。用此论及民主国家的自主性或者民主政治与公共政策的问题,似乎也没有大的启发。不过作者的颜值还是蛮高的
Pepper Culpepper joined the EUI as Professor of Political Science in January 2010. His research focuses on the intersection between capitalism and democracy, both in politics and in public policy.
His book Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan (Cambridge University Press 2011), was awarded the 2012 Stein Rokkan Prize for Comparative Social Science Research. He is the author of Creating Cooperation (Cornell University Press, 2003) and co-editor of Changing France (with Peter Hall and Bruno Palier, Palgrave 2006) and of The German Skills Machine (with David Finegold, Berghahn Books 1999).
His work has appeared in Comparative Political Studies, International Organization, Politics & Society, Socio-Economic Review, World Politics, Revue Française de Science Politique, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, West European Politics, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of Public Policy, and the Oxford Review of Economic Policy. A former Marshall Scholar at Oxford University, he has also held long-term visiting appointments in France, Germany, and Japan.
Does democracy control business, or does business control democracy? This study of how companies are bought and sold in four countries – France, Germany, Japan and the Netherlands – explores this fundamental question. It does so by examining variation in the rules of corporate control – specifically, whether hostile takeovers are allowed. Takeovers have high political stakes: they result in corporate reorganizations, layoffs and the unraveling of compromises between workers and managers. But the public rarely pays attention to issues of corporate control. As a result, political parties and legislatures are largely absent from this domain. Instead, organized managers get to make the rules, quietly drawing on their superior lobbying capacity and the deference of legislators. These tools, not campaign donations, are the true founts of managerial political influence.
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Quiet Politics and Business Power 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2025