具体描述
The history of strategic bombing is inextricably linked with that of the RAF. This book explores the question of doctrinal development in the RAF, employing a neo-Clausewitzian analysis to reveal that the RAF based the preparation of its strategic bombing force on supposition and hypothesis. Rather than review the evidence of the World War I objectively to determine the fundamental principles of "strategic bombing", the RAF adopted a subjective approach. The failure to develop a realistic theory of strategic bombing and to test it through a dialectical process resulted in a lack of attention to the equally necessary element of doctrine. Bomber Command was incapable of carrying out a strategic bombing campaign because it failed in peace to develop the necessary doctrine.
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