Is it either possible or desirable to aim at truth? The answer seems clearly 'yes'. However, the question of what it really means for our beliefs and assertions to be 'truth-directed' is not obvious. In a highly original treatment, Nicholas Unwin argues that we need to weaken our ordinary notion of a belief if we are to deal with radical scepticism without surrendering to idealism. Topics examined also include the realism/anti-realism debate, whether there could be alien conceptual schemes, the relationship between genuine belief and mere pragmatic acceptance, and what might happen to us if we abandoned the former in place of the latter. A new 'ecological' model of knowledge is defended which does not logically imply the truth of what is known. However, it is also shown that desirability of believing only what is true can be given a partial, though adequate defence.
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