Andrew Krepinevich is President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.

He assumed this position in 1993, following a 21-year career in the U.S. Army.

Dr. Krepinevich has served in the Department of Defense’s Office of Net Assessment, and

on the personal staff of three secretaries of defense. He has also served as a member of the

National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation,

the Joint Forces Command Advisory Board, and the Defense Policy Board. He currently

serves on the Chief of Naval Operations' (CNO's) Advisory Board and on the Army Special

Operations Command's Advisory Board.

Dr. Krepinevich frequently contributes to print and broadcast media. He has lectured before

a wide range of professional and academic audiences, and has served as a consultant on military

affairs for many senior government officials, including several secretaries of defense,

the CIA’s National Intelligence Council, and all four military services. He has testified frequently

before Congress. Dr. Krepinevich has taught on the faculties of West Point, George

Mason University, Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies,

and Georgetown University.

Dr. Krepinevich's most recent book is 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores

War in the 21st Century. His other recent works include Strategy in a Time of Austerity:

Why the Pentagon Should Focus on Assuring Access; The Dangers of a Nuclear Iran;

and The Pentagon’s Wasting Assets, published in Foreign Affairs; and CSBA monographs:

Cyber Warfare: A “Nuclear Option”?; Strategy in Austerity; AirSea Battle: A Point-of-Departure

Operational Concept (co-author); and The Road Ahead (co-author). Dr. Krepinevich

received the 1987 Furniss Award for his book, The Army and Vietnam.

A graduate of West Point, Dr. Krepinevich holds an M.P.A. and Ph.D. from Harvard

University. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.

For over two decades, the U.S. military has enjoyed a near-monopoly in precision-guided weaponry and their associated battle networks. Recently, however, the proliferation of these capabilities to other militaries and non-state entities is gathering momentum. Through case studies of Mediterranean operations and kamikazes in World War II, the Mediterranean no-go zone in the Cold War, the Falklands War, and the First Gulf War, Dr. Andrew Krepinevich assesses the trajectory of maritime warfare. He finds that the advent of long-range sensors and strike capabilities may ultimately shrink oceans to "Mediterranean size," imposing severe restrictions on the freedom of maneuver of surface naval forces, similar to those faced by navies operating in the Mediterranean in World War II. Krepinevich proposes four operational concepts in light of these challenges, centered on winning the "scouting campaign," depleting adversary long-range strike systems, and engaging in peripheral campaigns. The assessment and these concepts can inform the debate within the professional military and strategic studies characteristics of future maritime warfare and allow the United States to shape the competitive regime to its liking.