Why do some governing parties limit their opportunistic behaviour and constrain the extraction of private gains from the state? This analysis of post-communist state reconstruction provides surprising answers to this fundamental question of party politics. Across the post-communist democracies, governing parties have opportunistically reconstructed the state - simultaneously exploiting it by extracting state resources and building new institutions that further such extraction. They enfeebled or delayed formal state institutions of monitoring and oversight, established new discretionary structures of state administration, and extracted enormous informal profits from the privatization of the communist economy. By examining how post-communist political parties rebuilt the state in Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia, Grzymala-Busse explains how even opportunistic political parties will limit their corrupt behaviour and abuse of state resources when faced with strong political competition.
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對於蘇聯解體後分齣的一批“真民主”國傢來說,政黨競爭更強烈的國傢,對國傢資源的有效利用,製度的進步就更為可期。相當有解釋力,但政黨競爭程度從哪個方麵看都更像是一個中介變量。
评分簡單的因果機製,以有效的政黨製衡(共產黨本身的活力)作為主要的變量之一。
评分對於蘇聯解體後分齣的一批“真民主”國傢來說,政黨競爭更強烈的國傢,對國傢資源的有效利用,製度的進步就更為可期。相當有解釋力,但政黨競爭程度從哪個方麵看都更像是一個中介變量。
评分對於蘇聯解體後分齣的一批“真民主”國傢來說,政黨競爭更強烈的國傢,對國傢資源的有效利用,製度的進步就更為可期。相當有解釋力,但政黨競爭程度從哪個方麵看都更像是一個中介變量。
评分對於蘇聯解體後分齣的一批“真民主”國傢來說,政黨競爭更強烈的國傢,對國傢資源的有效利用,製度的進步就更為可期。相當有解釋力,但政黨競爭程度從哪個方麵看都更像是一個中介變量。
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