This book takes a provocative look at the UN peacekeeping system, arguing that it has largely outlived its usefulness and is bound to fail when applied to currently predominant violent and messy conflagrations. The author argues that, in the absence of radical changes in that system, the UN should disarm, restricting the peacekeeping to military observers' missions and to subcontracting other operations out to military alliances and regional organisations. He confronts two basic peacekeeping myths. First, the belief that peacekeeping is distinct from peace enforcement blurs this distinction and undermines the viability of peacekeeping operations, yet that distinction remains a cornerstone of the UN doctrine. Secondly, it is widely believed that the peacekeepers are allowed to apply force only in self-defence and lack the authorisation to use it in defending UN Security Councils mandates. This myth persists, even in cases when the UN Security Council undertakes explicit authorisation to enforce specific goals of the mandate. The author offers a critical re-appraisal of the fundamental principles of peacekeeping, including both the largest successes (Namibia) and worst disasters (Rwanda). Drawing heavily on personal accounts, the book is solidly anchored in official primary sources originating from the UN, national governments, parliamentary inquiries (Dutch, French and Belgian) and from the International Criminal Tribunal on Rwanda. It integrates the most recent recommendations related to peacekeeping originating from High-Level Panels and endorsed by Kofi Annan. Finally, it exposes how the UN peacekeeping syndrome of "soldiers' safety first" crept into the NATO's strategy and compromises its missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan.