In this controversial book, Keith Krehbiel investigates and casts doubt upon a view of Congress held by many academics, journalists, and members of the lay public: that Congress is organized primarily to facilitate logrolling or "gains from trade" between legislators. The author puts forward an alternative "informational" theory that, unlike previous formal theories, highlights institutional needs and individual incentives for acquiring policy expertise. Using games with incomplete information, Krehbiel derives a set of unique and testable predictions about the organization of legislatures -- including the composition of committees and the procedures under which legislation is considered.
Krehbiel's creative illustrations and nonmathematical presentation of formal theories make this book accessible to a diverse set of readers. The political relevance and testability of games with incomplete information will be appreciated by game theorists and economists, while the book's findings make it essential reading for political scientists who study American politics, political institutions, or democratic legislatures.
具體描述
讀後感
評分
評分
評分
評分
用戶評價
立法機構的信息理論
评分對美國國會組織的經驗研究，檢驗的假說直接基於formal theories。主要洞見是，國會的委員會製度以及相關立法流程主要作用是促進分工和信息傳輸。主要懟瞭以Shepsle，Weingast和Marshall為代錶的、把委員會體係當成製度化分配豬肉桶工具的理論。
评分立法機構的信息理論
评分對美國國會組織的經驗研究，檢驗的假說直接基於formal theories。主要洞見是，國會的委員會製度以及相關立法流程主要作用是促進分工和信息傳輸。主要懟瞭以Shepsle，Weingast和Marshall為代錶的、把委員會體係當成製度化分配豬肉桶工具的理論。
评分立法機構的信息理論
相關圖書
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息，本站不存儲任何數據與內容，任何內容與數據均與本站無關，如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度，google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 qciss.net All Rights Reserved. 小哈圖書下載中心 版权所有