How can the baffling problems of phenomenal experience be accounted for? In this provocative book, Fred Dretske argues that to achieve an understanding of the mind it is not enough to understand the biological machinery by means of which the mind does its job. One must understand what the mind's job is and how this task can be performed by a physical system--the nervous system.Naturalizing the Mind skillfully develops a representational theory of the qualitative, the phenomenal, the what-it-is-like aspects of the mind that have defied traditional forms of naturalism. Central to Dretske's approach is the claim that the phenomenal aspects of perceptual experiences are one and the same as external, real-world properties that experience represents objects as having. Combined with an evolutionary account of sensory representation, the result is a completely naturalistic account of phenomenal consciousness.* Not for sale in France or Belgium
具体描述
读后感
评分
评分
评分
评分
用户评价
德雷斯克对如何将意识问题纳入到自然科学研究体系中的一次尝试。面对由内格尔等人引发的意识难问题，也就是如何理解qualia的问题，他的策略是目的功能主义，但他只是改变了原来的表征关系，本质上还是表征。
评分德雷斯克对如何将意识问题纳入到自然科学研究体系中的一次尝试。面对由内格尔等人引发的意识难问题，也就是如何理解qualia的问题，他的策略是目的功能主义，但他只是改变了原来的表征关系，本质上还是表征。
评分德雷斯克对如何将意识问题纳入到自然科学研究体系中的一次尝试。面对由内格尔等人引发的意识难问题，也就是如何理解qualia的问题，他的策略是目的功能主义，但他只是改变了原来的表征关系，本质上还是表征。
评分Dretske is awesome
评分Dretske is awesome
相关图书
本站所有内容均为互联网搜索引擎提供的公开搜索信息，本站不存储任何数据与内容，任何内容与数据均与本站无关，如有需要请联系相关搜索引擎包括但不限于百度，google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 book.wenda123.org All Rights Reserved. 图书目录大全 版权所有