During the later part of the 20th century, military theorists and others began to believe that new technologies were generating a "revolution in military affairs" (RMA), providing capabilities so revolutionary that they would redefine warfare. Led by President George W. Bush and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, the U.S. Department of Defense set out to transform the US armed forces by adopting RMA concepts and spending billions to make the hypothetical capabilities real. The entire structure of the armed forces changed as a result; however, this vision is totally dependent on a set of unproven and often non-existent capabilities, especially a network of information technologies. Without these developments, the result is a set of small, less capable battle platforms. This is the only book-length examination of the way that the US Army and the Defense Department have tried to create in reality the revolutionary capabilities promised by the high-tech Revolution in Military Affairs. It is the only in-depth account of the effect that RMA and transformation concepts had on the American operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. The author argues that the U.S. needs to fight the war it has, not the war it wants. Many of the problems in both Iraq and Afghanistan arose from the Department of Defense's implacable desire to implement RMA-driven transformation concepts whether they were appropriate or not.