Personal Agency 在线电子书 图书标签:
发表于2024-11-08
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Interactive substance dualism的绝世之作。为什么会有如此精妙的理论。虽然自己的论文反驳他,但是Lowe是最令我敬重的一位大师,毋宁说,与他之间感到一种真实的学术想法之间的相通。
评分Interactive substance dualism的绝世之作。为什么会有如此精妙的理论。虽然自己的论文反驳他,但是Lowe是最令我敬重的一位大师,毋宁说,与他之间感到一种真实的学术想法之间的相通。
评分Interactive substance dualism的绝世之作。为什么会有如此精妙的理论。虽然自己的论文反驳他,但是Lowe是最令我敬重的一位大师,毋宁说,与他之间感到一种真实的学术想法之间的相通。
评分Interactive substance dualism的绝世之作。为什么会有如此精妙的理论。虽然自己的论文反驳他,但是Lowe是最令我敬重的一位大师,毋宁说,与他之间感到一种真实的学术想法之间的相通。
评分Interactive substance dualism的绝世之作。为什么会有如此精妙的理论。虽然自己的论文反驳他,但是Lowe是最令我敬重的一位大师,毋宁说,与他之间感到一种真实的学术想法之间的相通。
Personal Agency consists of two parts. In Part II, a radically libertarian theory of action is defended which combines aspects of agent causalism and volitionism. This theory accords to volitions the status of basic mental actions, maintaining that these are spontaneous exercises of the will-a 'two-way' power which rational agents can freely exercise in the light of reason. Lowe contends that substances, not events, are the causal source of all change in the world-with rational, free agents like ourselves having a special place in the causal order as unmoved movers, or initiators of new causal chains. And he defends a thoroughgoing externalism regarding reasons for action, holding these to be mind-independent worldly entities rather than the beliefs and desires of agents. Part I prepares the ground for this theory by undermining the threat presented to it by physicalism. It does this by challenging the causal closure argument for physicalism in all of its forms and by showing that a dualistic philosophy of mind-one which holds that human mental states and their subjects cannot be identified with bodily states and human bodies respectively-is both metaphysically coherent and entirely consistent with known empirical facts.
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Personal Agency 在线电子书 pdf 下载 txt下载 epub 下载 mobi 下载 2024