This book is a defense of realism about truth. The author argues that the most plausible version of realism is a correspondence theory of Truth that takes thought as the primary bearer of truth value. Anti-realists about Truth have seemed to argue that one cannot make sense of a world of 'truth-makers' that exists independently of representations of that world. While it may be true that there is no Truth without minds, one still needs the category of representation-independent fact, the author argues, to serve as truth-maker. In embracing this form of realism, the author does not want to deny the critical role that mind, through its representations, plays in structuring the reality that exists independently of those representations. Furthermore, after distinguishing realism about Truth from various sorts of metaphysical realisms, the author suggests that one can embrace much of anti-realist rhetoric from within the framework of a variety of plausible claims about the way in which minds do and must represent the world.
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