米蘭達．弗里克 MIRANDA FRICKER，英國哲學家，現任紐約城市大學研究中心哲學教授，亦為謝菲爾德大學兼任哲學教授。她在獲得雅各森研究獎學金後，獲得牛津大學的博士學位，之後又取得倫敦大學英國國家學術院博士後獎學金。直到2012年，她都擔任倫敦大學伯貝克學院審稿人和哲學系主任，研究領域包括倫理學、知識論和女權主義哲學。2016年當選為英國學院成員。

弗里克最有名的是她對「知識的不正義」的探索，在她2007年出版的《知識的不正義》一書中，弗里克認為，除了女性和少數群體所面臨的社會或政治不正義之外，還存在著一種不正義，叫做知識的不正義，這種隱而未現的不正義，傷害了個人與社會。

Epistemic Injustice explores the idea that there is a distinctively epistemic kind of injustice - injustice which consists in a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower. Miranda Fricker distinguishes two forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. Testimonial injustice occurs when prejudice causes a hearer to give a deflated level of credibility to a speaker's word; as in the case where the police do not believe someone because he is black. Hermeneutical injustice, by contrast, occurs when a gap in collective interpretative resources puts someone at an unfair disadvantage when it comes to making sense of their social experiences. A central case of this sort of injustice is found in the example of a woman who suffers sexual harassment prior to the time when we acquired this critical concept, so that she cannot properly comprehend her own experience, let alone render it communicatively intelligible to others. In connection with each of these forms of epistemic injustice, Fricker develops the idea that our testimonial sensibility needs to incorporate a corrective, anti-prejudicial virtue that can be used to promote a more veridical and a more democratic epistemic practice. Epistemology as it has traditionally been pursued has been impoverished by the lack of any theoretical framework conducive to revealing the ethical and political aspects of our epistemic conduct. Epistemic Injustice shows that virtue epistemology provides a general epistemological idiom in which these issues can be fruitfully and forcefully discussed.