具体描述
Commenting on his collaboration with Geoffrey Brennan on "The Power to Tax", James M. Buchanan says that the book is "demonstrable proof of the value of genuine research collaboration across national-cultural boundaries." Buchanan goes on to say that "The Power to Tax" is informed by a single idea - the implications of a revenue-maximizing government." Originally published in 1980, "The Power to Tax" was a much-needed answer to the tax revolts sweeping across the United States. It was a much-needed answer as well in the academic circles of tax theory, where orthodox public finance models were clearly inadequate to the needs at hand. The public-choice approach to taxation which Buchanan had earlier elaborated stood in direct opposition to public-finance orthodoxy.What Buchanan and Brennan constructed in "The Power to Tax" was a middle ground between the two. As Brennan writes in the foreword, "The underlying motivating question was simple: Why not borrow the motivational assumptions standard in public-choice theory and put them together with assumptions about policy-maker discretion taken from public-finance orthodoxy?" The result was a controversial book - and a much misunderstood one as well. Looking back twenty years later, Brennan feels confirmed in the rightness of the theories he and Buchanan espoused, particularly in their unity with the public-choice tradition: "The insistence on motivational symmetry is a characteristic feature of the public choice approach, and it is in this dimension that "The Power to Tax" and the orthodox public-finance approach diverge."
作者简介
目录信息
Preface xxi
1. Taxation in Constitutional Perspective 3
1.1 The Notion of a “Constitution” 5
1.2 The Logic of a Constitution 6
1.3 The Means of Constitutional Constraint 8
1.4 The Wicksellian Ideal and Majoritarian Reality 9
1.5 The Power to Tax 11
1.6 The Enforceability of Constitutional Contract 13
1.7 Normative Implications 14
2. Natural Government: A Model of Leviathan 16
2.1 Leviathan as Actuality and as Contingency 18
2.2 Monopoly Government and Popular Sovereignty 20
2.3 The Model of ``Leviathan'': Revenue Maximization 33
2.4 The Model of Leviathan as Monolith 35
2.5 The Constitutional Criteria 37
3. Constraints on Base and Rate Structure 42
3.1 Government as Revenue Maximizer Subject to Constitutional Tax Constraints 46
3.2 Tax-Base and Tax-Rate Constraints in a Simple Model 48
3.3 One among Many 55
3.4 Tax Limits and Tax Reform 59
Appendix: Progression in the Multiperson Setting 61
4. The Taxation of Commodities 67
4.1 The Conventional Wisdom 68
4.2 Constitutional Tax Choice 70
4.3 Alternative Forms of Commodity Tax: The Choice of Base 71
4.4 Uniformity of Rates over Commodities 79
4.5 Uniformity of Rates over Individuals 83
4.6 Discrimination by Means of the Rate Structure 84
4.7 Summary 95
Appendix 96
5. Taxation through Time: Income Taxes, Capital Taxes, and Public Debt 99
5.1 Income Taxes, Capital Taxes, and Public Debt in Orthodox Public Finance 101
5.2 The Timing of Rate Announcement 103
5.3 Income and Capital Taxes under Perpetual Leviathan 110
5.4 Leviathan's Time Preference 116
5.5 The Time Preference of the Taxpayer-Citizen with Respect to Public Spending 121
5.6 The Power to Borrow 122
5.7 Conclusions 126
6. Money Creation and Taxation 129
6.1 The Power to Create Money 131
6.2 Inflation and the Taxation of Money Balances: A “Land” Analogy 134
6.3 Inflation and the Taxation of Money Balances 138
6.4 Inflationary Expectations under Leviathan 144
6.5 Inflation, Wealth Taxation, and the Durability of Money 149
6.6 The Orthodox Discussion of Inflation as a Tax 150
6.7 The Monetary Constitution 153
6.8 Inflation and Income Tax Revenue 155
6.9 Monetary Rules and Tax Rules 157
7. The Disposition of Public Revenues 160
7.1 The Model 162
7.2 Public-Goods Supply under a Pure Surplus Maximizer: Geometric Analysis 164
7.3 The Surplus Maximizer: Algebraic Treatment 170
7.4 The Nonsurplus Maximizer 175
7.5 Toward a Tax Policy 177
8. The Domain of Politics 181
8.1 Procedural Constraints on Political Decision Making 182
8.2 The Rule of Law: General Rules 184
8.3 The Domain of Public Expenditures 190
8.4 Government by Coercion 192
9. Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority 197
9.1 Toward a Tax Constitution for Leviathan in an Open Economy with Trade but without Migration 198
9.2 Tax Rules in an Open Economy with Trade and Migration 200
9.3 Federalism as a Component of a Fiscal Constitution 203
9.4 An Alternative Theory of Government Grants 212
9.5 A Tax Constitution for a Federal State 214
9.6 Conclusions 215
10. Toward Authentic Tax Reform: Prospects and Prescriptions 218
10.1 Taxation in Constitutional Perspective 221
10.2 Tax Reform as Tax Limits 224
10.3 Tax-Rate Limits: The Logic of Proposition 13 229
10.4 Tax-Base Constraints 231
10.5 Aggregate Revenue and Outlay Limits: Ratio-Type Proposals for Constitutional Constraint 233
10.6 Procedural Limits: Qualified Majorities and Budget Balance 234
10.7 Toward Authentic Tax Reform 237
Epilogue 239
Selected Bibliography 241
Index 249
· · · · · · (收起)
读后感
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作为一名对社会运作机制充满好奇的读者，一本探讨“税收的力量”的书，对我来说简直是太有吸引力了。我总觉得，在所有影响社会运行的因素中，税收可能是那个最核心、最隐秘，却又最具有塑造力的。我猜想，这本书不会仅仅停留在理论层面，而是会以一种抽丝剥茧的方式，深入到税收如何实际影响我们日常生活方方面面。它可能会讲述那些看似微小的税收政策，如何引发巨大的经济涟漪，如何改变人们的消费习惯，甚至如何影响人口流动和城市发展。我特别期待书中能够出现一些令人意想不到的案例，展现税收在历史进程中扮演的意想不到的角色，比如，它是否曾被用作推翻政权，或巩固统治的工具？我也希望这本书能帮助我理解，在不同政治体制下，税收的“力量”是如何被分配和使用的。究竟是权力精英说了算，还是民意能够真正影响税收的走向？我期待这本书能够提供一个更全面的视角，让我从一个更宏观、更深刻的角度去理解税收，将其视为一种动态的社会力量，而不是冷冰冰的数字。
评分在我拿到这本书之前，我脑海中对“税收”的印象，往往是抽象的数字和繁琐的规定，甚至带有一丝“被剥夺感”。然而，“The Power to Tax”这个标题，却给我一种截然不同的感受，它暗示着一种主动的力量，一种可以被运用、被塑造、被影响的能力。这让我对书的内容充满了好奇和期待。我希望这本书能够颠覆我以往的认知，它或许会从一个全新的角度去审视税收，不再仅仅将其视为一项义务，而是将其描绘成一个国家实现其宏大愿景、解决社会问题的强大工具。我猜想，书中可能会探讨税收如何被用来推动基础设施建设、支持科技创新、保护环境，甚至促进文化发展。它可能会通过生动的案例，展示那些善于运用税收政策的国家，是如何在激烈的全球竞争中脱颖而出的。同时，我也希望这本书能够触及税收背后更深层次的权力分配问题，比如，税收是如何反映和加剧社会不平等的，以及普通民众在税收决策中扮演着怎样的角色。总而言之，我期待这本书能够赋予我一种更积极、更主动的视角来理解税收，让我看到它蕴含的巨大潜力和深远影响。
评分这不仅仅是一本关于税收的书，在我看来，它更像是打开了一扇通往理解权力运作和资源分配机制的大门。我一直认为，任何一个社会的稳定与发展，都离不开对其经济基础的深刻洞察，而税收，恰恰是这种经济基础最直接的体现和最核心的构成部分。我预设这本书将不会是一篇冰冷的学术论文，而是会以一种引人入胜的方式，带领读者穿越历史的长河，探寻税收制度的演变轨迹，从古老的赋税征收，到现代复杂的税收体系，每一步都可能蕴含着政治博弈、经济决策和民众生活的变迁。我特别期待它能够深入解析不同国家在税收政策上的选择，以及这些选择所带来的截然不同的社会后果。例如，某个国家为何选择了高税收但高福利的模式，而另一个国家又为何倾向于低税收刺激经济增长，书中是否能揭示其背后的深层原因？我希望这本书能够帮助我建立一个更宏观的视野，理解税收是如何塑造国家竞争力、影响国际关系，甚至成为地缘政治博弈中的一种策略。读完这本书，我希望自己能够摆脱对税收的片面认知，将其视为一个动态的、充满复杂性的社会力量，能够更清晰地理解当下世界经济格局和政治格局的形成原因。
评分这本书的出现，着实让我眼前一亮。在浩瀚的书海中，一本聚焦“税收的力量”的书，本身就带着一种不容忽视的重量感。我一直对社会运行的底层逻辑和权力结构有着强烈的好奇，而税收，无疑是连接个人与国家，也是塑造社会形态的关键纽带。这本书的标题直接点明了核心，让我对书中将要探讨的税收如何渗透到经济、政治、甚至文化层面的影响产生了极大的兴趣。我非常期待它能深入剖析税收在国家治理中的双刃剑效应，既能是推动社会进步的引擎，也可能成为滋生不公的温床。我想，这本书不会仅仅停留在理论的探讨，更会结合丰富的历史案例和现实的经济数据，来印证“税收的力量”是如何在不同时期、不同国家展现其独特作用的。比如，它可能会分析不同税收制度对创新创业的影响，或是探讨税收如何被用作调节贫富差距、实现社会公平的工具。当然，我也希望这本书能引发我对于自身作为纳税人的角色和权利的更深层思考，了解我们手中的每一分钱是如何被转化成公共服务的，以及我们是否有能力和途径去监督和影响这一过程。这本书的潜力，在于它能够将一个看似枯燥的经济概念，转化成一堂生动而深刻的社会学和政治学课程。
评分读到“The Power to Tax”这个书名，我的第一反应是：这绝非一本仅仅罗列税种和计算公式的枯燥读物。它所蕴含的“力量”二字，预示着一场关于国家权力、社会契约和经济主导权的深刻探讨。我迫切想知道，作者是如何阐释税收这一看似日常的经济行为，实则承载着国家意志，影响着社会结构，甚至决定着未来走向的。我设想，书中可能会深入剖析税收政策的设计艺术，以及它如何巧妙地引导经济行为，激励某些产业的发展，或遏制某些不希望看到的趋势。这种“力量”或许还体现在税收作为一种社会调控手段，在应对危机、缩小贫富差距、促进可持续发展等方面的作用。我期待作者能够用清晰的逻辑和扎实的证据，为我们揭示税收如何在不同文化和社会背景下，展现出其独特的“权力”面向。例如，西方国家与东方国家在税收观念上的差异，以及这些差异如何影响了其经济发展模式和治理方式。更重要的是，我希望这本书能够让我意识到，税收不仅仅是政府的权力，也是公民参与社会治理的一种重要体现，理解并运用好这份“力量”，对于每个个体和社会都至关重要。
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