Social scientists teach that politicians favor groups that are organized over those that are not. Representation Through Taxation challenges this conventional wisdom. Emphasizing that there are limits to what organized interests can credibly promise in return for favorable treatment, Gehlbach shows that politicians may instead give preference to groups – organized or not – that by their nature happen to take actions that are politically valuable. Gehlbach develops this argument in the context of the postcommunist experience, focusing on the incentive of politicians to promote sectors that are naturally more tax compliant, regardless of their organization. In the former Soviet Union, tax systems were structured around familiar revenue sources, magnifying this incentive and helping to prejudice policy against new private enterprise. In Eastern Europe, in contrast, tax systems were created to cast the revenue net more widely, encouraging politicians to provide the collective goods necessary for new firms to flourish.
Honorable Mention, 2009 Davis Center Book Prize in Political and Social Studies, American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies
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经济学的学生抢饭碗系列...08年的时候用formal model和回归在这个领域还是比较少见吧，讲苏联时期的税制差异（Corporate v. Individual）怎么延续到解体后的，不过确实可以看出理论部分过于简单了
评分经济学的学生抢饭碗系列...08年的时候用formal model和回归在这个领域还是比较少见吧，讲苏联时期的税制差异（Corporate v. Individual）怎么延续到解体后的，不过确实可以看出理论部分过于简单了
评分经济学的学生抢饭碗系列...08年的时候用formal model和回归在这个领域还是比较少见吧，讲苏联时期的税制差异（Corporate v. Individual）怎么延续到解体后的，不过确实可以看出理论部分过于简单了
评分经济学的学生抢饭碗系列...08年的时候用formal model和回归在这个领域还是比较少见吧，讲苏联时期的税制差异（Corporate v. Individual）怎么延续到解体后的，不过确实可以看出理论部分过于简单了
评分经济学的学生抢饭碗系列...08年的时候用formal model和回归在这个领域还是比较少见吧，讲苏联时期的税制差异（Corporate v. Individual）怎么延续到解体后的，不过确实可以看出理论部分过于简单了
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