Daniel W. Drezner is a professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University and a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution. Prior to Fletcher, he taught at the University of Chicago and the University of Colorado at Boulder.

He has previously held positions with Civic Education Project, the RAND Corporation and the U.S. Department of the Treasury, and received fellowships from the German Marshall Fund of the United States, the Council on Foreign Relations, and Harvard University.

He received his B.A. in political economy from Williams College and an M.A. in economics and Ph.D. in political science from Stanford University.

Drezner is the author of four books -- most recently, Theories of International Politics and Zombies -- and the editor of two others. He has published articles in numerous scholarly journals as well as in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, The New Republic, and Foreign Affairs. Time magazine named Drezner's blog as one of the best in 2012.

For more about Drezner and his work, visit his website at www.danieldrezner.com.

Has globalization diluted the power of national governments to regulate their own economies? Are international governmental and nongovernmental organizations weakening the hold of nation-states on global regulatory agendas? Many observers think so. But in "All Politics Is Global", Daniel Drezner argues that this view is wrong. Despite globalization, states - especially the great powers - still dominate international regulatory regimes, and the regulatory goals of states are driven by their domestic interests. As Drezner shows, state size still matters.The great powers - the United States and the European Union - remain the key players in writing global regulations, and their power is due to the size of their internal economic markets. If they agree, there will be effective global governance. If they don't agree, governance will be fragmented or ineffective. And, paradoxically, the most powerful sources of great-power preferences are the least globalized elements of their economies. Testing this revisionist model of global regulatory governance on an unusually wide variety of cases, including the Internet, finance, genetically modified organisms, and intellectual property rights, Drezner shows why there is such disparity in the strength of international regulations.