What determines the size and form of redistributive programs, the extent and type of public goods provision, the burden of taxation across alternative tax bases, the size of government deficits, and the stance of monetary policy during the course of business and electoral cycles? A large and rapidly growing literature in political economics attempts to answer these questions. But so far there is little consensus on the answers and disagreement on the appropriate mode of analysis.Combining the best of three separate traditions--the theory of macroeconomic policy, public choice, and rational choice in political science--Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini suggest a unified approach to the field. As in modern macroeconomics, individual citizens behave rationally, their preferences over economic outcomes inducing preferences over policy. As in public choice, the delegation of policy decisions to elected representatives may give rise to agency problems between voters and politicians. And, as in rational choice, political institutions shape the procedures for setting policy and electing politicians. The authors outline a common method of analysis, establish several new results, and identify the main outstanding problems.
具體描述
讀後感
評分
評分
評分
評分
用戶評價
高微 focus on Chapter4+chapter12. 2019 宮崎
评分理論教材。沒學過高級微觀讀得有點吃力。以公共財政問題為焦點，對各個選題的分析建立都建立在幾個基準模型上。最精彩的是comparative politics這一章。缺點是太老，完全局限於鞏固的民主政治，沒有反映近十幾年的理論進展，對經驗文獻的有限討論也也局限於90年代那些（現在看來因果識彆上非常粗糙的）研究。
评分高微 focus on Chapter4+chapter12. 2019 宮崎
评分看著費神 不清楚
评分看著費神 不清楚
相關圖書
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息，本站不存儲任何數據與內容，任何內容與數據均與本站無關，如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度，google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 qciss.net All Rights Reserved. 小哈圖書下載中心 版权所有