Illustrations and Table page xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Preface xv
1 Electoral Competition under Certainty 1
1.1 The Hotelling-Downs Model 2
1.2 The Wittman Model 6
1.3 Multiparty Competition 8
1.4 Entry 12
Exercises 23
2 Electoral Competition under Uncertainty 27
2.1 Multidimensional Policy Con
ict 27
2.2 Divergence 33
2.3 Multiparty Competition 35
2.4 Entry 37
2.5 The Calculus of Voting 38
Exercises 42
3 Special Interest Politics 46
3.1 A Model of Pure Campaign Finance 46
3.2 Campaign Finance and Policy Choice 50
3.3 Informative Campaign Finance 54
3.4 Bargaining over Policy 57
3.5 Menu Auctions 63
Exercises 67
4 Veto Players 74
4.1 Policy Stability 75
4.2 Agenda Setting 77
4.3 Pivots 81
4.4 Portfolio Allocation 88
4.5 Veto Players and Special Interests 91
Exercises 93
5 Delegation 98
5.1 Baseline Model 99
5.2 Discretion Limits 101
5.3 Legislative Capacity 103
5.4 Bureaucratic Capacity 105
5.5 Administrative Procedures 109
5.6 Legislative Override 112
5.7 Delegation to Committees and Legislative Procedure 114
Exercises 117
6 Coalitions 122
6.1 Legislative Bargaining 123
6.2 Cohesion 132
6.3 Government Formation 135
6.4 Endogenous Supermajorities 140
6.5 Selectorates 143
Exercises 152
7 Political Agency 157
7.1 The Barro-Ferejohn Model 158
7.2 Career Concerns 166
7.3 Signaling Models of Political Agency 174
Exercises 178
8 Regime Change 184
8.1 Collective Action under Complete Information 185
8.2 Collective Action under Incomplete Information 187
8.3 Markov Games 189
8.4 Political Transitions 193
Exercises 205
References 211
Author Index 223
Subject Index 226
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