阿德里安·沃缪勒(Adrian Vermeule)先后毕业于哈佛学院(1990)和哈佛法学院(1993)。曾任美国哥伦比亚特区巡回区联邦上诉法院法官戴维·森特尔和联邦最高法院大法官安东宁。斯卡利亚的助乎。1998-2005年期间任教于芝加哥大学法学院，2006年至今任教于哈佛法学院。现为哈佛法学院小约翰·H.沃森法律教授。研究领域包括行政法、宪法、立法和国家安全法。

主要著作：《宪法系统》(The system of the Constitution)《法律与理性的限度》(Law and the Limits of Reason)《民主的机制：制度设计缩影》(Mechanisms ofDemocracy：Institutional Design Writ Small)《危急状态中的恐惧：安全、自由与法院》(Terror inthe Balance：security，Liberty，and the Courts)

How should judges, in America and elsewhere, interpret statutes and the Constitution? Previous work on these fundamental questions has typically started from abstract views about the nature of democracy or constitutionalism, or the nature of legal language, or the essence of the rule of law. From these conceptual premises, theorists typically deduce an ambitious role for judges, particularly in striking down statutes on constitutional grounds. In this book, Adrian Vermeule breaks new ground by rejecting both the conceptual approach and the judge-centred conclusions of older theorists. Vermeule shows that any approach to legal interpretation rests on institutional and empirical premises about the capacities of judges and the systemic effects of their rulings. Drawing upon a range of social science tools from political science, economics, decision theory and other disciplines, he argues that legal interpretation is above all an exercise in decision-making under severe empirical uncertainty. In view of their limited information and competence, judges should adopt a restrictive, unambitious set of tools for interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions, deferring to administrative agencies where statutes are nuclear and deferring to legislatures where constitutional language is unclear or states general aspirations.