阿德裏安·沃繆勒(Adrian Vermeule)先後畢業於哈佛學院(1990)和哈佛法學院(1993)。曾任美國哥倫比亞特區巡迴區聯邦上訴法院法官戴維·森特爾和聯邦最高法院大法官安東寜。斯卡利亞的助乎。1998-2005年期間任教於芝加哥大學法學院，2006年至今任教於哈佛法學院。現為哈佛法學院小約翰·H.沃森法律教授。研究領域包括行政法、憲法、立法和國傢安全法。

主要著作：《憲法係統》(The system of the Constitution)《法律與理性的限度》(Law and the Limits of Reason)《民主的機製：製度設計縮影》(Mechanisms ofDemocracy：Institutional Design Writ Small)《危急狀態中的恐懼：安全、自由與法院》(Terror inthe Balance：security，Liberty，and the Courts)

How should judges, in America and elsewhere, interpret statutes and the Constitution? Previous work on these fundamental questions has typically started from abstract views about the nature of democracy or constitutionalism, or the nature of legal language, or the essence of the rule of law. From these conceptual premises, theorists typically deduce an ambitious role for judges, particularly in striking down statutes on constitutional grounds. In this book, Adrian Vermeule breaks new ground by rejecting both the conceptual approach and the judge-centred conclusions of older theorists. Vermeule shows that any approach to legal interpretation rests on institutional and empirical premises about the capacities of judges and the systemic effects of their rulings. Drawing upon a range of social science tools from political science, economics, decision theory and other disciplines, he argues that legal interpretation is above all an exercise in decision-making under severe empirical uncertainty. In view of their limited information and competence, judges should adopt a restrictive, unambitious set of tools for interpreting statutory and constitutional provisions, deferring to administrative agencies where statutes are nuclear and deferring to legislatures where constitutional language is unclear or states general aspirations.