Libertarian Accounts of Free Will 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2024

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Randolph Clarke 作者

Oxford University Press, USA

譯者

2006-2-23 出版日期

256 頁數

USD 40.00 價格

Paperback

叢書系列

9780195306422 圖書編碼

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發表於2024-12-29

Libertarian Accounts of Free Will 在線電子書 epub 下載 mobi 下載 pdf 下載 txt 下載 2024

Libertarian Accounts of Free Will 在線電子書 epub 下載 pdf 下載 mobi 下載 txt 下載 2024

Libertarian Accounts of Free Will 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2024

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Libertarian Accounts of Free Will 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 在線電子書下載

Libertarian Accounts of Free Will 在線電子書圖書描述

This comprehensive study offers a balanced assessment of libertarian accounts of free will. Bringing to bear recent work on action, causation, and causal explanation, Clarke defends a type of event-causal view from popular objections concerning rationality and diminished control. He subtly explores the extent to which event-causal accounts can secure the things for the sake of which we value free will, judging their success here to be limited. Clarke then sets out a highly original agent-causal account, one that integrates agent causation and nondeterministic event causation. He defends this view from a number of objections but argues that we should find the substance causation required by any agent-causal account to be impossible. Clarke concludes that if a broad thesis of incompatibilism is correct--one on which both free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism--then no libertarian account is entirely adequate.

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