Barry Eichengreen (born 1952) is an American economist who holds the title of George C. Pardee and Helen N. Pardee Professor of Economics and Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, where he has taught since 1987.[2] Eichengreen's mother is Lucille Eichengreen, a Holocaust survivor and author.
He has done research and published widely on the history and current operation of the international monetary and financial system. He received his BA from UC Santa Cruz and his Ph.D. from Yale University in 1979. He was a senior policy advisor to the International Monetary Fund in 1997 and 1998, although he has since been critical of the IMF.
His best known work is the book Golden Fetters: The Gold Standard and the Great Depression, 1919–1939, Oxford University Press, 1992.
The two great financial crises of the past century are the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession, which began in 2008. Both occurred against the backdrop of sharp credit booms, dubious banking practices, and a fragile and unstable global financial system. When markets went into cardiac arrest in 2008, policymakers invoked the lessons of the Great Depression in attempting to avert the worst. While their response prevented a financial collapse and catastrophic depression like that of the 1930s, unemployment in the U.S. and Europe still rose to excruciating high levels. Pain and suffering were widespread.
The question, given this, is why didn't policymakers do better? Hall of Mirrors, Barry Eichengreen's monumental twinned history of the two crises, provides the farthest-reaching answer to this question to date. Alternating back and forth between the two crises and between North America and Europe, Eichengreen shows how fear of another Depression following the collapse of Lehman Brothers shaped policy responses on both continents, with both positive and negative results. Since bank failures were a prominent feature of the Great Depression, policymakers moved quickly to strengthen troubled banks. But because derivatives markets were not important in the 1930s, they missed problems in the so-called shadow banking system. Having done too little to support spending in the 1930s, governments also ramped up public spending this time around. But the response was indiscriminate and quickly came back to haunt overly indebted governments, particularly in Southern Europe. Moreover, because politicians overpromised, and because their measures failed to stave off a major recession, a backlash quickly developed against activist governments and central banks. Policymakers then prematurely succumbed to the temptation to return to normal policies before normal conditions had returned. The result has been a grindingly slow recovery in the United States and endless recession in Europe.
Hall of Mirrors is both a major work of economic history and an essential exploration of how we avoided making only some of the same mistakes twice. It shows not just how the "lessons" of Great Depression history continue to shape society's response to contemporary economic problems, but also how the experience of the Great Recession will permanently change how we think about the Great Depression.
“人类从历史中学到的唯一教训,就是人类无法从历史中学到任何教训。”其实还可以补充几句:即使学到的教训也是一时一地一面的教训;人们只会学到自己有过切肤之痛的教训;教训会随着时间的推移而淡化,最终可能反过来觉得这算不上教训… 面对危机,作者的观点明确直接:货币政...
评分“人类从历史中学到的唯一教训,就是人类无法从历史中学到任何教训。”其实还可以补充几句:即使学到的教训也是一时一地一面的教训;人们只会学到自己有过切肤之痛的教训;教训会随着时间的推移而淡化,最终可能反过来觉得这算不上教训… 面对危机,作者的观点明确直接:货币政...
评分《镜厅:大萧条,大衰退,我们做对了什么,又做错了什么》 由于时间的关系,我最近一直在思考关于大萧条时代到底是什么,又是怎么回事。 仔细想来,我这一代人大体上一上班开始,基本上就不断地碰见经济危机的说词,全球的。而幸运的是,十几年来,所有的灾难似乎都是在他国,...
评分为什么会发生危机? 第一条原因,是心理因素。人们会持有“持续性偏见”,当事情进展顺利时,人们倾向于认为会继续好下去。换个大家容易懂的说法,人性普遍具有的“贪婪性” 第二条原因,人类的盲从性,天真地相信教科书所告诉我们的,即金融市场是“有效的”。 第三条原因,是...
评分《镜厅:大萧条,大衰退,我们做对了什么,又做错了什么》 由于时间的关系,我最近一直在思考关于大萧条时代到底是什么,又是怎么回事。 仔细想来,我这一代人大体上一上班开始,基本上就不断地碰见经济危机的说词,全球的。而幸运的是,十几年来,所有的灾难似乎都是在他国,...
怎么说呢,废话有点多
评分如果只有第四部分,应该是5颗星。历史的确可以给我们很多洞见,可是看书来说,喜欢看洞见,不喜欢看历史
评分以历史为镜,聚焦于30年代大萧条于07-08年金融危机的比较经济金融史分析,思想上杂糅反金本位/固定汇率制、弗里德曼式货币政策分析与新凯恩斯主义。主要观点认为后金融危机的欧美政府有汲取历史教训而通过及时降低利率、救助银行 注资市场与增加公共财政支出来保障流动性与巩固投资者信心,但这些措施在避免了灾难性萧条的同时被过早终止从而导致恢复更缓慢,并使得危机背后金融制度的结构性问题没能得到完全的改革与监督。Eichengreen对凯恩斯式政府注水支出的支持有点简单粗暴(虽然认识到推行扩张性财政政策的政治阻力),对宏观经济分析及公共政策辩论的把握要强于他对金融系统结构性问题的理论性阐述,对Fed或ECB等监督监管者危机之前的失职的批判也不够给力,不过总体而言确实是一部历史记述与分析并重的力作。
评分strong opinioned book scattered with humor
评分strong opinioned book scattered with humor
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