Amos Tversky (1937–1996), a towering figure in cognitive and mathematical psychology, devoted his professional life to the study of similarity, judgment, and decision making. He had a unique ability to master the technicalities of normative ideals and then to intuit and demonstrate experimentally their systematic violation due to the vagaries and consequences of human information processing. He created new areas of study and helped transform disciplines as varied as economics, law, medicine, political science, philosophy, and statistics.

ELDAR SHAFIR

Professor of Psychology and Public Affairs

Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988

CONTACT INFO

T: 609.258.5624

E: shafir@princeton.edu

3-S-14 Green Hall

Psychology Department

Princeton University

Princeton, NJ 08540

RESEARCH SUMMARY

Most of the work focuses on descriptive analyses of inference, judgment, and decision making, and on issues related to behavioral economics. The research focuses primarily on how people make judgments and decisions in situations of conflict and uncertainty. What strategies do people employ in arriving at their decisions? Do these strategies lead to systematic biases and predictable errors? And what do these tell us about the way the mind processes the relevant information? Of particular interest is the contrast between normative and descriptive theories of rationality

This book collects forty of Tversky’s articles, selected by him in collaboration with the editor during the last months of Tversky’s life. It is divided into three sections: Similarity, Judgment, and Preferences. The Preferences section is subdivided into Probabilistic Models of Choice, Choice under Risk and Uncertainty, and Contingent Preferences. Included are several articles written with his frequent collaborator, Nobel Prize-winning economist Daniel Kahneman.