This book discusses the main shortcomings of the classical solution concept from noncooperative game theory (that of Nash equilibria) and provides a comprehensive study of the more refined concepts (such as sequential, perfect, proper and stable equilibria) that have been introduced to overcome these drawbacks. The plausibility of the assumptions underlying each such concept are discussed, desirable properties as well as deficiencies are illustrated, characterizations are derived and the relationships between the various concepts are studied. The first six chapters provide an informal discussion with many examples as well as a comprehensive overview for normal form games. The remaining chapters are devoted to specific applications, illustrating the strength (resp. weakness) of the various concepts.
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系统介绍了一些博弈论中相对冷僻的知识点。行文不是特别流畅，部分章节可读性较差。不过论可读性可能没有书能够超越Myerson了吧。
评分系统介绍了一些博弈论中相对冷僻的知识点。行文不是特别流畅，部分章节可读性较差。不过论可读性可能没有书能够超越Myerson了吧。
评分系统介绍了一些博弈论中相对冷僻的知识点。行文不是特别流畅，部分章节可读性较差。不过论可读性可能没有书能够超越Myerson了吧。
评分系统介绍了一些博弈论中相对冷僻的知识点。行文不是特别流畅，部分章节可读性较差。不过论可读性可能没有书能够超越Myerson了吧。
评分系统介绍了一些博弈论中相对冷僻的知识点。行文不是特别流畅，部分章节可读性较差。不过论可读性可能没有书能够超越Myerson了吧。
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