Why Dominant Parties Lose pdf epub mobi txt 電子書 下載2025
Kenneth F. Greene is Assistant Professor of Government at the University of Texas at Austin. His research on regimes, political parties, and voting behavior has been published in Comparative Political Studies, PS: Political Science and Politics, Politica y Gobierno, and Foreign Affairs en Espanol. He has served as Co-Principal Investigator on two National Science Foundation grants for elite and voter survey research in Mexico, won a Fulbright-Garcia Robles fellowship, and held visiting positions at the Center for Democracy and Civil Society at Georgetown University and at the Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame. He received his PhD from the University of California, Berkeley in 2002.
- 比較政治
- 拉美研究
- 威權主義
- 民主轉型
- 獨大型政黨
- 政黨政治
- election
- 民主政治
Why have dominant parties persisted in power for decades in countries spread across the globe? Why did most eventually lose? Why Dominant Parties Lose develops a theory of single-party dominance, its durability, and its breakdown into fully competitive democracy. Greene shows that dominant parties turn public resources into patronage goods to bias electoral competition in their favor and virtually win elections before election day without resorting to electoral fraud or bone-crushing repression. Opposition parties fail because their resource disadvantages force them to form as niche parties with appeals that are out of step with the average voter. When the political economy of dominance erodes, the partisan playing field becomes fairer and opposition parties can expand into catchall competitors that threaten the dominant party at the polls. Greene uses this argument to show why Mexico transformed from a dominant party authoritarian regime under PRI rule to a fully competitive democracy.
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同樣是resoure theory，kenneth就倒騰齣瞭這麼好的一本書！ 2008 Best Book Award from the Comparative Democratization Section of the APSA.
评分同樣是resoure theory，kenneth就倒騰齣瞭這麼好的一本書！ 2008 Best Book Award from the Comparative Democratization Section of the APSA.
评分Magaloni的那部著作寫的挺像自民黨的。公共經濟學目前的研究進展到何種程度現在還不清楚。但是在日本，現在利益誘導型政治的集票效果的具體研究，的確是有著非常不一緻的報告。一大問題自然是，當財政數據是有的時候，50-80年代選舉和選民調查的全國數據是非常不健全的。另一大問題則是，利益誘導型政治所作用的因果機製，也是不明不白的（後援會，地方議員或者是公共事業建設團體）。現在比較確定的，可以通過經驗研究得到的結論，大概是SNTV製度對於一黨優位製度的維持起到瞭直接可觀察的作用。之於pork politics現在在日本政治研究裏還是metaphor。94年之後的政黨體製變動進一步削弱瞭這一假說的信心。不過，從PRI那裏的確是可以得到對於LDP的諸多啓發的
评分在位者優勢根源於資源，把國傢的變為黨的。DPARs下，反對黨隻能定位於niche party，伺機而動，再成為真正的挑戰者。迴答的問題就是書名。
评分和Magaloni那本對照著看很有啓發。兩本書都將單一黨主導統治（single-party dominance）概念化為一種均衡，而這種均衡從1982年開始因為經濟狀況的改變而無法延續的。但是，對於選民與政黨精英在結束主導黨統治中的作用，兩本書有不同的看法。Magaloni著重關注經濟危機給選民造成的不滿，而本書著重強調反對黨利用這種不滿的能力。
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