Arthur Ripstein is Professor of Law and Philosophy and University Professor. He was appointed to the Department of Philosophy in 1987, promoted to full professor in 1996, appointed to the Faculty of Law in 1999, and appointed to the rank of University Professor in 2016. He received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Pittsburgh, a degree in law from Yale, and an undergraduate degree from the University of Manitoba.

Professor Ripstein's research and teaching interests include torts, legal theory, and political philosophy. In addition to numerous articles in legal theory and political philosophy, he is the author of Private Wrongs (Harvard 2016), Force and Freedom: Kant's Legal and Political Philosophy (Harvard 2009) and Equality, Responsibility and the Law (Cambridge 1999). He is editor of Ronald Dworkin (Cambridge 2007) and co-editor of Law and Morality (Toronto 1996, second edition 2001, third edition 2007), and Practical Rationality and Preference (Cambridge 2001). He is currently writing a book on Immanuel Kant’s account of the law and morality of war, for which he was awarded a Killam Fellowship from the Canada Council. He is an Associate Editor of Philosophy and Public Affairs, a former Associate Editor of Ethics and the Canadian Journal of Philosophy, serves on the editorial board of Legal Theory, and is Advisory Editor of the Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence. His popular work has appeared on Ideas on CBC Radio One.

In this masterful work, both an illumination of Kant’s thought and an important contribution to contemporary legal and political theory, Arthur Ripstein gives a comprehensive yet accessible account of Kant’s political philosophy. Ripstein shows that Kant’s thought is organized around two central claims: first, that legal institutions are not simply responses to human limitations or circumstances; indeed the requirements of justice can be articulated without recourse to views about human inclinations and vulnerabilities. Second, Kant argues for a distinctive moral principle, which restricts the legitimate use of force to the creation of a system of equal freedom. Ripstein’s description of the unity and philosophical plausibility of this dimension of Kant’s thought will be a revelation to political and legal scholars.

In addition to providing a clear and coherent statement of the most misunderstood of Kant’s ideas, Ripstein also shows that Kant’s views remain conceptually powerful and morally appealing today. Ripstein defends the idea of equal freedom by examining several substantive areas of law—private rights, constitutional law, police powers, and punishment—and by demonstrating the compelling advantages of the Kantian framework over competing approaches.