Experiences and feelings are inherently conscious states. There is something it is like to feel pain, to have an itch, to experience bright red. Philosophers call this sort of consciousness "phenomenal consciousness." Even though phenomenal consciousness seems to be a relatively primitive matter, something more widespread in nature than higher-order or reflective consciousness, it is deeply puzzling.In 1995 Michael Tye proposed a theory of phenomenal consciousness now known as representationalism. This book is, in part, devoted to a further development of that theory along with replies to common objections. Tye's focus is broader than representationalism, however. Two prominent challenges for any reductive theory of consciousness are the explanatory gap and the knowledge argument. In part I of this book, Tye suggests that these challenges are intimately related. The best strategy for dealing with the explanatory gap, he claims, is to consider it a kind of cognitive illusion. Part II of the book is devoted to representationalism. Part III connects representationalism with two more general issues. The first is the nature of color. Tye defends a commonsense, objectivist view of color and argues that such a view is compatible with modern color science. In the final chapter, Tye addresses the question of where on the phylogenetic scale phenomenal consciousness ceases, arguing that consciousness extends beyond the realm of vertebrates to such relatively simple creatures as the honeybee.
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寫論文時選的主要參考文獻。吸引我的地方就是Tye很強的reductive representationalism。夠簡潔，夠乾淨。但這本書裏能還原的的consciousness隻局限於perceptual experience ，不涉及其他的心靈狀態（比如信念，情感，而這一類的心靈狀態又不是以phenomenal character為區分的）。總體來說，Tye的論證還是比較精緻的，在intensionality of phenomenal talk的論證（來自Chisholm的“看談”）中對non conceptual 的強調，是我覺得最符閤直覺也最關鍵的地方。
评分寫論文時選的主要參考文獻。吸引我的地方就是Tye很強的reductive representationalism。夠簡潔，夠乾淨。但這本書裏能還原的的consciousness隻局限於perceptual experience ，不涉及其他的心靈狀態（比如信念，情感，而這一類的心靈狀態又不是以phenomenal character為區分的）。總體來說，Tye的論證還是比較精緻的，在intensionality of phenomenal talk的論證（來自Chisholm的“看談”）中對non conceptual 的強調，是我覺得最符閤直覺也最關鍵的地方。
评分寫論文時選的主要參考文獻。吸引我的地方就是Tye很強的reductive representationalism。夠簡潔，夠乾淨。但這本書裏能還原的的consciousness隻局限於perceptual experience ，不涉及其他的心靈狀態（比如信念，情感，而這一類的心靈狀態又不是以phenomenal character為區分的）。總體來說，Tye的論證還是比較精緻的，在intensionality of phenomenal talk的論證（來自Chisholm的“看談”）中對non conceptual 的強調，是我覺得最符閤直覺也最關鍵的地方。
评分寫論文時選的主要參考文獻。吸引我的地方就是Tye很強的reductive representationalism。夠簡潔，夠乾淨。但這本書裏能還原的的consciousness隻局限於perceptual experience ，不涉及其他的心靈狀態（比如信念，情感，而這一類的心靈狀態又不是以phenomenal character為區分的）。總體來說，Tye的論證還是比較精緻的，在intensionality of phenomenal talk的論證（來自Chisholm的“看談”）中對non conceptual 的強調，是我覺得最符閤直覺也最關鍵的地方。
评分寫論文時選的主要參考文獻。吸引我的地方就是Tye很強的reductive representationalism。夠簡潔，夠乾淨。但這本書裏能還原的的consciousness隻局限於perceptual experience ，不涉及其他的心靈狀態（比如信念，情感，而這一類的心靈狀態又不是以phenomenal character為區分的）。總體來說，Tye的論證還是比較精緻的，在intensionality of phenomenal talk的論證（來自Chisholm的“看談”）中對non conceptual 的強調，是我覺得最符閤直覺也最關鍵的地方。
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