Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
扫了一下豆瓣上这本书的评论,看到有人提到越不平等的社会越容易出现革命的这个说法。其实书里面并不是这么表述的。作者们的意思,如果我理解准确的话,应该是,出现革命的威胁和政治经济上不平等的关系是一个U型曲线。在社会平等的状态下,革命的威胁就会相对比较低,而在一定...
评分民主出现的可能性—由权贵和民众间的博弈成本决定的。 本质上是一种对未来权力分配的可信承诺。 民主—制度—民众拥有的政治权利达到高峰,权贵的政策让步又不可信的情况下出现。 影响民主化和民主化巩固的重要因素—经济不平等,权贵的收入来源,全球化 核心观点:民主是一种...
评分政治经济学最近成为一个很热的话题。Acemoglu美国MIT的教授,成为这个领域最火热的代表人物。其一年在top5杂志上发表文章的速度,也让同行们望其项背。而在这本《economic origin of dictatorship and democracy》书籍中,作者又展示了自己的大抱负,大志向。而作为研究经济学...
评分作者用高度抽象的博弈模型来分析民主与经济的关系,优点是逻辑关系清晰,缺点是对于具体事件,还要具体研究。 一、民主是对未来权力分配的可信承若。 民众人数较多,当组织起来争取权力时,能暂时掌握事实政治权力(实力),并要求得到法定政治权力参与政治。权贵就会在镇压成...
评分他们的argument是这样的: 非民主制度有利于精英的经济利益分配,民主制度有利于大众的经济利益分配。 是否民主取决于精英和大众的政治力量。 政治力量分两种:事实上的和法理上的。 事实政治力量是短暂集结的,过期就会消失,但事实力量能帮助精英或大众夺权,体现在政变和民...
民主研究的必读,细细咀嚼
评分读完只有膜拜...才不会承认读到模型就囫囵吞枣呢!同时也生出奇怪的感想,接受现实吧在可预见的学术生涯,都要和这种范式打交道了。而时代流行的范式,本是一枚学渣无从选择的。
评分role of political power (de jure vs de facto) and role of political institutions in allocating future political power; nature of poli- and eco- structure, structure of economy, collective-action, cost and benefit; social conflict as main driving force that leads to different in political institutions.
评分Acemoglu 实在是太厉害了!!我非常佩服他
评分基本上就是一本解Markov Perfect Equilibrium的书。建模思想很简单但是结论很强大。
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