Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 在線電子書 圖書標籤: 政治經濟學 經濟學 economics 政治學 Acemoglu 政治 社會學 politics
發表於2024-12-22
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2024
看完隻能說牛,非常佩服
評分role of political power (de jure vs de facto) and role of political institutions in allocating future political power; nature of poli- and eco- structure, structure of economy, collective-action, cost and benefit; social conflict as main driving force that leads to different in political institutions.
評分沒有細讀。
評分沒有細讀。
評分看完隻能說牛,非常佩服
Daron Acemoglu is Charles P. Kindleberger Professor of Applied Economics at The Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He received the 2005 John Bates Clark Medal awarded by the American Economic Association to the best economist working in the United States under age 40. He is the author of the textbook Introduction to Modern Economic Growth and coeditor of Econometrica and NBER Macroannual.
James A. Robinson is Professor of Government at Harvard University. He is a Faculty Associate at the Institute for Quantitative Social Science and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs and is a member of the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research's Program on Institutions, Organizations, and Growth. He is coeditor with Jared Diamond of Natural Experiments in History (2009).
What forces lead to democracy's creation? Why does it sometimes consolidate only to collapse at other times? Written by two of the foremost authorities on this subject in the world, this volume develops a framework for analyzing the creation and consolidation of democracy. It revolutionizes scholarship on the factors underlying government and popular movements toward democracy or dictatorship. Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson argue that different social groups prefer different political institutions because of the way they allocate political power and resources. Their book, the subject of a four-day seminar at Harvard's Center for Basic Research in the Social Sciences, was also the basis for the Walras-Bowley lecture at the joint meetings of the European Economic Association and Econometric Society in 2003 and is the winner of the John Bates Clark Medal.
他们的argument是这样的: 非民主制度有利于精英的经济利益分配,民主制度有利于大众的经济利益分配。 是否民主取决于精英和大众的政治力量。 政治力量分两种:事实上的和法理上的。 事实政治力量是短暂集结的,过期就会消失,但事实力量能帮助精英或大众夺权,体现在政变和民...
評分 評分说是评论,其实完全没有必要,因为本书的内容是如此的完整和清晰以至于任何说明乃至于困惑的评论都没有空间,作者充分贯彻了研究的铁律【说光所有的故事,让其他人说个球】。 我想对经济学或政治经济学不太熟悉的尤其是政治学社会学的童鞋看到书名应该首先会呵呵,变量太多不好...
評分说是评论,其实完全没有必要,因为本书的内容是如此的完整和清晰以至于任何说明乃至于困惑的评论都没有空间,作者充分贯彻了研究的铁律【说光所有的故事,让其他人说个球】。 我想对经济学或政治经济学不太熟悉的尤其是政治学社会学的童鞋看到书名应该首先会呵呵,变量太多不好...
評分作者用高度抽象的博弈模型来分析民主与经济的关系,优点是逻辑关系清晰,缺点是对于具体事件,还要具体研究。 一、民主是对未来权力分配的可信承若。 民众人数较多,当组织起来争取权力时,能暂时掌握事实政治权力(实力),并要求得到法定政治权力参与政治。权贵就会在镇压成...
Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy 在線電子書 pdf 下載 txt下載 epub 下載 mobi 下載 2024