卡尔. 沃尔特， 在中国生活了20年，并积极参与了多项金融改革工作，他在1992年的中国企业首例海外IPO和1994年首批中国国有企业在纽约证券交易所上市过程中发挥了重要作用。他是中国第一家也是最成功的合资投资银行——中国国际金融有限公司的管委会成员，在那里，他支持了一批中国主要企业的股票和债券的发行。最近，他帮助全球主要投资银行创建了最成功和最有利可图的安全货币交易业务。他能说流利的普通话，毕业于北京大学，并拥有普林斯顿大学博士学位。现居纽约，是独立顾问。

弗雷泽. 豪伊， 曾在剑桥大学学习自然科学（物理），在北京语言文化大学学习中文。近20年来他一直从事亚洲股票交易和市场的分析、写作，同时在香港工作，在信托银行和摩根士丹利从事股权交易。1998年到中国，在中国国际金融有限公司销售和交易部门工作，后进入中国 M&A 管理公司。他曾加盟南华早报、亚洲华尔街日报、中国经济研究季刊和中国经济评论，并为CNBC、BBC、半岛电视台和彭博社撰写评论。他是一家帮助国际投资者在印度和中国市场投资的新加坡亚太经纪公司的董事总经理。

祝捷，特许金融分析师（CFA）。先后就读于中国人民大学、北京大学光华管理学院、纽约大学斯特恩商学院，获工商管理硕士学位。曾就职于中国建设银行、中国金融期货交易所，兼职于北京懋源投资有限公司、中银国际（亚洲）有限公司。现任渣打银行（中国）有限公司投资策略分析师。

刘骏，特许金融分析师（CFA）和注册风险管理师（FRM）。先后就读于南京大学、耶鲁大学、约翰·霍普金斯大学商学院，获经济硕士、金融理学硕士学位，曾就职于中国银行、世界银行总部，现在加拿大联邦住房及信贷公司工作。

For many years now China's economy has seemed unstoppable. A slow appreciation of the renminbi in 2007 brought wave upon wave of liquidity into China and allowed its companies and banks to raise hundreds of billions in dollars via stock market listings. State banks that had started the new century as bankrupt relics of a communist past became the darlings of international investors.

Even the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008 and the ensuing global financial crisis seemed to have little impact on China as the government quickly responded with a huge stimulus package. But the Lehman collapse was a dramatic wake up call to the Chinese leadership. This model of bank and capital market reform had been studiously emulated for more than a decade and had brought great benefits to China. But now, although they believed it to be bankrupt, the Chinese government were bereft of new ideas. In the face of the global financial crisis the government returned to what it knows best, massive state intervention via the banking system. Ten years of banking and capital market reforms were dead.

In Red Capitalism, Carl Walter and Fraser Howie detail how the Chinese government reformed and modeled its financial system in the 30 years since it began its policy of engagement with the west. Instead of a stable series of policies producing steady growth, China's financial sector has boomed and gone bust with regularity in each decade. The latest decade is little different. Chinese banks have become objects of political struggle while they totter under balance sheets bloated by the excessive state-directed lending and bond issuance of 2009.

Looking forward, the government's response to the global financial crisis has created a banking system the stability of which can be maintained only behind the walls of a non-convertible currency, a myriad of off-balance sheet arrangements with non-public state entities and the strong support of its best borrowers--the politically potent National Champions--who are the greatest beneficiaries of the financial status quo.

China's financial system is not a model for the west and, indeed, is not a sustainable arrangement for China itself as it seeks increasingly to assert its influence internationally. This is not a story of impending collapse, but of frustrated reforms that suggests that any full opening and meaningful reform of the financial sector is not, indeed cannot be, on the government's agenda anytime soon.