Yuan-kang Wang is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Western Michigan University and Center Associate in the Lieberthal-Rogel Center for Chinese Studies at the University of Michigan in Ann Arbor. He holds a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Chicago. He was an International Security Fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs and a Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution's Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies. Prior to joing WMU, he taught at the Department of Political Science at Northern Illinois University and the Department of Diplomacy at National Chengchi University in Taiwan.

Dr. Wang specializes in international relations, historical China, Taiwan security, and U.S.-China relations. His research examines the nexus between international relations theory and historical China. He is author of Harmony and War: Confucian Culture and Chinese Power Politics (Columbia University Press, 2011), which debunks the myth of Confucian pacifism in Chinese grand strategy, use of force, and war aims. He has published journal articles on peripheral nationalism in China, nationalist mobilization during Taiwan’s democratization, U.S. extended deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, Taiwan public opinion on cross-Strait security issues, and a realist explanation of the Sinocentric tribute system.

Confucianism has shaped a certain perception of Chinese security strategy, symbolized by the defensive, nonaggressive Great Wall. Many believe China is antimilitary and reluctant to use force against its enemies. Instead, the country practices pacifism and refrains from expanding its boundaries, even when nationally strong.

In a path-breaking study that travels seven hundred years of Chinese history, Yuan-kang Wang resoundingly discredits this notion, recasting China as a practitioner of realpolitik and a ruthless purveyor of expansive grand strategies. Leaders of the Song Dynasty (960-1279) and Ming Dynasty (1368-1644) prized military force and shrewdly assessed the strength of China's adversaries. They adopted defensive strategies only when their country was weak and pursued expansive goals, such as territorial acquisition, enemy destruction, and total military victory, when their country was strong. Despite the dominance of an antimilitarist Confucian culture, warfare was not uncommon in the bulk of Chinese history. Grounding his research in primary Chinese sources, Wang outlines a politics of power that are crucial to understanding China's strategies today, especially its policy of "peaceful development," which it has adopted only because of military, economic, and technological weakness in relation to the United States.