Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
一、搭便车理论的核心观点以及方法论基础 本书作者奥尔森创造性的在集体行动的研究领域,引入了传统经济学经常强调的个体主义方法论的视角。 传统的社会理论家研究集团行为时总是认为,组织或集团的存在是为了维护其成员的共同利益,而且它们也能有效的做到这一点。而奥尔森从...
评分奥尔森教授阐述了一个社会科学研究中的最基本的问题:集体行动会发生吗?传统智慧(加尔布雷斯)认为:集体的存在是为了增进集体的利益,理性的集体成员都会为了集体的利益而行动,也即亚当斯密提到的理性的个人采取行动,达致的结果是社会的共同利益,换言之就是个人理性会导...
评分众所周知,梁文道在我心目中,是和余秋雨并蒂的文化奇葩。追根溯源,是因为一次看凤凰卫视,不知聊什么话题,梁文道突然脸一沉,正色道:直到今天,我仍然坚信“全世界无产者联合起来”。说完,他深深凝望了一下摄影机镜头,仿佛在说:看到没有,我才是坚定的马克思主义...
评分一、搭便车理论的核心观点以及方法论基础 本书作者奥尔森创造性的在集体行动的研究领域,引入了传统经济学经常强调的个体主义方法论的视角。 传统的社会理论家研究集团行为时总是认为,组织或集团的存在是为了维护其成员的共同利益,而且它们也能有效的做到这一点。而奥尔森从...
评分1.最近又翻看了一下这本书,买了10几年,书都发黄了。 2.原理仍然没问题,但时代多了互联网,结论可能会有较大变化。 3.行动成本与收益的测量是奥尔森理论的基础。 4.由于互联网的出现,行动成本,尤其是行动的串联成本大大降低,因此,在这个意义上,大集团的行动性质向小集团...
20150510.从经济学出发,帮助解读conflict,挺有新意的。
评分翻来覆去就是说个很简单的道理。难得在说的非常好!
评分members of large groups have no incentives to take collective action to obtain collective goods
评分奥尔森是个天才,博论做成这个样子,语言清晰简明逻辑清楚直白,实在厉害。读罢前两章的感觉,就是好像在理论内部的挑错完全进行不了了——他总是用长注堵住人的嘴:我都想到了哇!可是仔细想想,他的理论在这学期课程讨论的抗争政治意义上的集体行动中确实不太适用,大概有以下几个原因:第一,抗争政治群体的边界是更流动的,很难确定某一特定时间节点的总体规模,这样大小群体的区分不是被否定就是被弱化了;第二,抗争政治的结果是高度不确定的,和公共品的提供不同,没有人能真正计算出potential benefit来——即使可以,也高度不精确;最后,group size的乘数效应在抗争政治中更加明显:抗争多了一个人本身就带来大量的显性和隐性收益,小团体的抗争除非组织强大、目标明确、对象好找,否则失败的几率更高。
评分第一章看了好久还是云里雾里,果然还是不适合学经济。。
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