Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
奥尔森的这本《集体行动的逻辑》,是建立在理性人的假设基础上的。传统的看法认为“有共同利益的个人组成的集团通常总是试图增进那些共同的利益”,比如马克思的阶级观、民主国家中的“罢工”行为等。但是奥尔森教授从理性的“个体”展开研究之后,认为在大规模群体的集体...
評分转的。 我一直想不清楚工会的问题。认同经济学原理的人,基本都会认可,工会对于工人作为一整体的福祉是有害无益的。如果在劳动力市场上有许多剩余劳力,老板要是受不了工会了,只需要把工人全都辞退,雇一批新人就可以了(当然为此要付一点成本)。工会的作用,只不过给劳动力...
評分奥尔森教授阐述了一个社会科学研究中的最基本的问题:集体行动会发生吗?传统智慧(加尔布雷斯)认为:集体的存在是为了增进集体的利益,理性的集体成员都会为了集体的利益而行动,也即亚当斯密提到的理性的个人采取行动,达致的结果是社会的共同利益,换言之就是个人理性会导...
評分 評分懂瞭個大意。寒假前四章要仔細重讀。一個觀點很贊同:共同利益未必帶來集體行動,因為當集體較大時,搭便車行為開始變得顯著(說句俏皮話叫做三個和尚沒水喝),若無選擇性動機(selective incentive),集體可能無法有效完成行動。Downs(1959)也討論過類似問題,不過是從理性無知角度探討的。小利益集團由於獲利大,比平均分得利益較少的大集團更具有行動力也通常更有影響力,看愛荷華的農民就是一例,所以Mancur的討論很有現實意義。同時認為意識形態決定的行為通常無法持久,似乎也有曆史支持。是從一個非Huntington角度觀察香港示威遊行的實踐理論機會。哈佛大學Trumbull教授的反駁很有趣,但具有閤法溢價的閤法聯閤是否能,在什麼情況下能被動員還需看他的書纔可再論。
评分奧爾森是個天纔,博論做成這個樣子,語言清晰簡明邏輯清楚直白,實在厲害。讀罷前兩章的感覺,就是好像在理論內部的挑錯完全進行不瞭瞭——他總是用長注堵住人的嘴:我都想到瞭哇!可是仔細想想,他的理論在這學期課程討論的抗爭政治意義上的集體行動中確實不太適用,大概有以下幾個原因:第一,抗爭政治群體的邊界是更流動的,很難確定某一特定時間節點的總體規模,這樣大小群體的區分不是被否定就是被弱化瞭;第二,抗爭政治的結果是高度不確定的,和公共品的提供不同,沒有人能真正計算齣potential benefit來——即使可以,也高度不精確;最後,group size的乘數效應在抗爭政治中更加明顯:抗爭多瞭一個人本身就帶來大量的顯性和隱性收益,小團體的抗爭除非組織強大、目標明確、對象好找,否則失敗的幾率更高。
评分其實是應老師的要求看其中的一章,但是寫的還蠻好玩的我就去翻瞭全書。英文版很棒,讀起來一點都不拗口,也沒有很多生詞XD 說是group,但是沒有分析宗教組織哦,不知道是不是因為離理性的假設有些遠。附錄好看!個人覺得經濟部分比政治部分有意思得多……【啊我的周末就這麼沒有瞭!
评分翻來覆去就是說個很簡單的道理。難得在說的非常好!
评分Smart book. A footnote of Nietzsche's philosophy.
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