Mancur Lloyd Olson, Jr. (pronounced /ˈmænsər/[1] or /ˈmæŋkər/; January 22, 1932 – February 19, 1998) was a leading American economist and social scientist who, at the time of his death, worked at the University of Maryland, College Park. Among other areas, he made contributions to institutional economics on the role of private property, taxation, public goods, collective action and contract rights in economic development. Olson focused on the logical basis of interest group membership and participation. The reigning political theories of his day granted groups an almost primordial status. Some appealed to a natural human instinct for herding, others ascribed the formation of groups that are rooted in kinship to the process of modernization. Olson offered a radically different account of the logical basis of organized collective action.
This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.
1.最近又翻看了一下这本书,买了10几年,书都发黄了。 2.原理仍然没问题,但时代多了互联网,结论可能会有较大变化。 3.行动成本与收益的测量是奥尔森理论的基础。 4.由于互联网的出现,行动成本,尤其是行动的串联成本大大降低,因此,在这个意义上,大集团的行动性质向小集团...
評分一、搭便车理论的核心观点以及方法论基础 本书作者奥尔森创造性的在集体行动的研究领域,引入了传统经济学经常强调的个体主义方法论的视角。 传统的社会理论家研究集团行为时总是认为,组织或集团的存在是为了维护其成员的共同利益,而且它们也能有效的做到这一点。而奥尔森从...
評分众所周知,梁文道在我心目中,是和余秋雨并蒂的文化奇葩。追根溯源,是因为一次看凤凰卫视,不知聊什么话题,梁文道突然脸一沉,正色道:直到今天,我仍然坚信“全世界无产者联合起来”。说完,他深深凝望了一下摄影机镜头,仿佛在说:看到没有,我才是坚定的马克思主义...
評分上“行政学经典著作和前沿问题”的博士生课需要阅读大量的文献,并从中学会研究问题的方法,今天课上重点讨论的是David M. Hart的《奥尔森理论的再验证》(Political Representation Among Dominant Firms: Revisiting the "Olsonian Hypothesis"),涉及到对奥尔森集体行动...
評分“一个和尚挑水吃,两个和尚抬水吃,三个和尚没水吃。”这句耳熟能详的谚语故事想必很多人都知道。但我们往往只停留在故事本身的趣味性上,而忽视了它真正想表达的含义:“在一个群体中,随着人数的增多,人们主动为集体贡献的意愿会不断降低。” 我们生活中也到处是这样的例子...
Smart book. A footnote of Nietzsche's philosophy.
评分全書行文非常晦澀,背景知識是當年完全無知的工人運動與歐洲曆史,但“搭便車”的概念卻深入人心,對群眾運動有瞭奇怪的認知
评分集體利益和個人理性的權衡理論,結閤我國農村集體化生産曆史可以得到更深刻體會。
评分對於此書褒揚和運用已經甚多,無須贅述。反而有另外幾點值得提齣。一是,運用此書經常是批評大政府、階級政治等理念的無效,因為個人不肯貢獻力量取得公共品,但其實更好的運用可能是“逆用”或針對其問題的思考,即如何針對理性個人維護私利的特性,設計齣有效的激勵或威懾體製動員個人投身組織;二是,奧爾森把組織的公共品和選擇性激勵/私人收益截然分開,似乎值得商榷,這兩者或許在有重閤的時候能鼓勵個人行動(如諾斯所言),選擇性激勵也可以是所得公共品的優先分配—所以這裏公共利益在組織行動前後的性質會發生嬗變?三是,奧爾森的理論已經指明瞭交易成本(他稱為談判成本)在組織中的重要作用,比新製度經濟學諸君早;最後,不同於許多時人,書中清楚錶示理性人和經濟理論運用有其局限,此書無法涵蓋許多社會政治宗教方麵集體行動。
评分這本寫得真挺好看的。果然喜歡case呢
本站所有內容均為互聯網搜索引擎提供的公開搜索信息,本站不存儲任何數據與內容,任何內容與數據均與本站無關,如有需要請聯繫相關搜索引擎包括但不限於百度,google,bing,sogou 等
© 2025 qciss.net All Rights Reserved. 小哈圖書下載中心 版权所有