Douglass C. North is also professor of history and a fellow of the Center in Political Economy. He was on the faculty of the University of Washington and held visiting chairs at Cambridge and Rice Universities. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Economic History Association and the Western Economic Association. His major interest is the evolution of economic and political institutions. The effects of institutions on the development of economies through time is a major emphasis in his work in both economic history and development. Among his books are The Rise of the Western World (with R. P. Thomas, 2nd edition), 1973, Growth and Welfare in the American Past, 1973, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1981, and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990.
This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to identify the elements that allowed the Western European economy to rise to affluence. Their argument is made transparent in Chapter One (Theory and Overview): the key to growth was and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. They argue that property rights are classic public goods because: (1) once a more efficient set of property rights is discovered the marginal cost of copying it is low (compared to the cost of discovering and developing it); (2) it is prohibitively expensive to prevent other political jurisdictions from emulating a more efficient set of property rights regardless of whether they contributed to their construction; (3) and finally, the idea of a set of property rights, like all ideas, is non-rival -- we can all consume the same idea and the "stock" of the idea is not diminished. These public good aspects lead them to conclude that there may be under investment in the attempts to create more efficient sets of property rights because the jurisdiction that invests in the development of property rights pays the entire cost of their development but receives only benefits that accrue to its jurisdiction, while other jurisdictions can get the benefits without any of the developmental costs. Thus, the problems of public goods and the "free riders."
诺斯所阐述的“所有权的确定(或明晰)是近代西欧经济快速增长的动因”理论没有大瑕疵,问题出在翻译,很多句子初看让人摸不着头脑。 例如:“领主和他的骑士专门生产保护和公正,而依靠农奴来消费它们。”(第30页) 猜想译者想表达的是:领主和骑士不从事农业生产,他们依...
评分西方世界为何能够在近代兴起?这便是这本书要回答的问题。 什么才是经济增长的内在动因呢?这本书开宗明义的指出,“有效率的经济组织是经济增长的核心”,这也是西欧崛起的原因。而有效率的组织需要建立产权制度,以刺激“将个人的经济努力变成私人收益率接近社会收益率”的活...
评分西方世界为何能够在近代兴起?这便是这本书要回答的问题。 什么才是经济增长的内在动因呢?这本书开宗明义的指出,“有效率的经济组织是经济增长的核心”,这也是西欧崛起的原因。而有效率的组织需要建立产权制度,以刺激“将个人的经济努力变成私人收益率接近社会收益率”的活...
评分人口本身不是问题,制度才是关键。。但制度也要看社会进步的程度。。
评分这家伙喜欢跑题。对每个国家和时期论述时的重点与史料都使用不均,叙述中也不易分清这是历史现象还是ideally根据经济模型应该有的样子。很重要的土地私有化可流转的史实基本只给了十三世纪英国的。对于最重要的论点:交易成本的降低,在荷兰只讲到其然,未见最重要的所以然(为什么在法国和西班牙就实现不了)。同样解释了西班牙却解释不了更复杂的北意大利。总体的论点是很整齐的。
评分制度经济学的经典之作!
评分无需多说,大师级作品。历史叙述在一些地方还是比较entangled,但总体上来还是给人耳目一新的感觉。简明晚期中世纪与近代早期西方经济史,总体的大背景是中世纪晚期人口增长、土地拓垦导致的庄园经济向商品-货币-市场经济的转型,强调经济组织、强制机关与产权制度在促进私营部门开采市场资源上的关键作用,并形成了西方持续性的经济增长。虽然强调制度在促进经济增长时的作用,但整个的叙事还是建立在市场经济的基础上的。说白了,经济要增长,必须有市场。
评分这家伙喜欢跑题。对每个国家和时期论述时的重点与史料都使用不均,叙述中也不易分清这是历史现象还是ideally根据经济模型应该有的样子。很重要的土地私有化可流转的史实基本只给了十三世纪英国的。对于最重要的论点:交易成本的降低,在荷兰只讲到其然,未见最重要的所以然(为什么在法国和西班牙就实现不了)。同样解释了西班牙却解释不了更复杂的北意大利。总体的论点是很整齐的。
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