Douglass C. North is also professor of history and a fellow of the Center in Political Economy. He was on the faculty of the University of Washington and held visiting chairs at Cambridge and Rice Universities. In 1993 he was awarded the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics. He is a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and has served as president of the Economic History Association and the Western Economic Association. His major interest is the evolution of economic and political institutions. The effects of institutions on the development of economies through time is a major emphasis in his work in both economic history and development. Among his books are The Rise of the Western World (with R. P. Thomas, 2nd edition), 1973, Growth and Welfare in the American Past, 1973, Structure and Change in Economic History, 1981, and Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, 1990.
This is a landmark book on the impact of property rights on European economic development. Published over a quarter of a century ago, its stated goal is "... to suggest new paths for the study of European economic history rather than ... either [a detailed and exhaustive study or a precise empirical test that are the] ... standard formats" (p. vii). North and Thomas attempt to identify the elements that allowed the Western European economy to rise to affluence. Their argument is made transparent in Chapter One (Theory and Overview): the key to growth was and is an efficient economic system. Efficient in the sense that the system of property rights gives individuals incentives to innovate and produce, and, conversely inhibits those activities (rent-seeking, theft, arbitrary confiscation and/or excessive taxation) that reduce individual incentives. They argue that property rights are classic public goods because: (1) once a more efficient set of property rights is discovered the marginal cost of copying it is low (compared to the cost of discovering and developing it); (2) it is prohibitively expensive to prevent other political jurisdictions from emulating a more efficient set of property rights regardless of whether they contributed to their construction; (3) and finally, the idea of a set of property rights, like all ideas, is non-rival -- we can all consume the same idea and the "stock" of the idea is not diminished. These public good aspects lead them to conclude that there may be under investment in the attempts to create more efficient sets of property rights because the jurisdiction that invests in the development of property rights pays the entire cost of their development but receives only benefits that accrue to its jurisdiction, while other jurisdictions can get the benefits without any of the developmental costs. Thus, the problems of public goods and the "free riders."
如果没有海外殖民地的扩张,欧洲的民族国家运动也只不过是千年军阀混战的继续。因为很明显的,当这种殖民运动在北美、东亚受阻,同时因为各殖民国在殖民地争夺中互相照面的时候,譬如德、日与英、法的矛盾,就再次爆发了欧洲内战(即一战),这导致了苏俄的出现(之前的...
评分“路径依赖”。 延伸阅读 《经济史上的结构和变革》[美]道格拉斯·诺斯 《制度、制度变迁与经济绩效》[美]道格拉斯·诺斯 《understanding the process of economic change》[美]道格拉斯·诺斯 《西方世界的兴起》 作者: [美]道格拉斯·诺斯 / 罗伯特·托马斯 原作名:The Rise...
评分诺斯所阐述的“所有权的确定(或明晰)是近代西欧经济快速增长的动因”理论没有大瑕疵,问题出在翻译,很多句子初看让人摸不着头脑。 例如:“领主和他的骑士专门生产保护和公正,而依靠农奴来消费它们。”(第30页) 猜想译者想表达的是:领主和骑士不从事农业生产,他们依...
评分这本书也是拖了两年才看完
评分啰啰嗦嗦
评分诺斯有名的著作,其中财产权的分析很重要~
评分我始终还是觉得 黑死病主义是流氓行为、、
评分Efficient economic institution propelled the economic growth observed in western Europe.
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