The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
第一次上导师的课,老师就讲了如何读书的问题,听后深感惋惜,要是早听四年的话,估计我的本科生涯不会那么混乱,当然这也与我的性格有关,不过总不至于那么混乱。老师说读书应该按照由近及远、由专到通、强调专业和兴趣,并要求书籍与文章兼顾,因为后来出现的书一般都会...
评分五年前在清华共管学院进修时曾听过奥斯特罗姆的讲座,但全程英文,且当时我并未看过她的经典著作《公共事物的治理之道》,奔赴她的讲座纯属对第一位获得诺贝尔经济学奖女性的好奇。学院的王亚华老师曾赴美在她手下学习过一段时间,在公管院那么长时间,我也只听过他一次讲座,...
CPR
评分制度设计
评分还要看其它书,只能匆匆一阅。奥女士的思路同前辈名家截然不同:奥尔森、哈丁醉心于提出简洁的、解释力涵盖各种组织和情境的模型,奥女士反对如此过分简化的做法,提倡找出具体情境中影响公用品制度和决策的变量,再以机制加以串联,成为分析框架,用以分析不同的个案积聚成理论;奥尔森、萨缪尔森将公共品和私人物品截然分开,奥女士则指出公用资源在个人攫取机制上形同私人物品,在提供和维持机制上又近似于公共品,两个冲突的机制在不同的策略互动中碰撞,这一进路解决了奥尔森留下的“选择性激励”到底如何界定的问题;前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定,国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义,故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排,奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源,提出社区产权的第三条路。
评分"前代理论假定博弈结构的外在限制恒定,国家市场等机制皆有过分简化的定义,故解决方法不是外来权力就是产权安排,奥女士则着重考察小型社区情境中个人如何在互动中设定和改变博弈规则、分配公用资源,提出社区产权的第三条路。" 引自熊猫。只读了第一三六章的Chris
评分因为经典,所以近于常识;语言平顺,逻辑清晰。
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