The governance of natural resources used by many individuals in common is an issue of increasing concern to policy analysts. Both state control and privatisation of resources have been advocated, but neither the state nor the market have been uniformly successful in solving common pool resource problems. Offering a critique of the foundations of policy analysis as applied to natural resources, Elinor Ostrom here provides a unique body of empirical data to explore conditions under which common pool resource problems have been satisfactorily or unsatisfactorily solved. Dr Ostrom first describes three models most frequently used as the foundation for recommending state or market solutions. She then outlines theoretical and empirical alternatives to these models in order to illustrate the diversity of possible solutions. In the following chapters she uses institutional analysis to examine different ways - both successful and unsuccessful - of governing the commons. In contrast to the proposition of the tragedy of the commons argument, common pool problems sometimes are solved by voluntary organisations rather than by a coercive state. Among the cases considered are communal tenure in meadows and forests, irrigation communities and other water rights, and fisheries.
Elinor Ostrom (née Awan; born August 7, 1933) is an American political economist.[2] She was awarded the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences, which she shared with Oliver E. Williamson, for "her analysis of economic governance, especially the commons."[3] She was the first, and to date, the only woman to win the prize in this category. Her work is associated with the new institutional economics and the resurgence of political economy.[4]
Ostrom lives in Bloomington, IN, and is on the faculty of both Indiana University and Arizona State University. She holds a Distinguished Professor at Indiana University and is the Arthur F. Bentley Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University in Bloomington, as well as Research Professor and the Founding Director of the Center for the Study of Institutional Diversity at Arizona State University in Tempe. Ostrom also serves as a lead researcher for the Sustainable Agriculture and Natural Resource Management Collaborative Research Support Program (SANREM CRSP), managed by Virginia Tech and funded by USAID.[5]
经济学解决“公地悲剧”的第三条道路 经济学将自己的理论建立在“理性人”的基础上,也就是说个人的私利,通过市场这个“看不见的手”,能够导致公利的产生。从亚当·斯密到曼德维尔,然后经过20世纪的哈耶克和弗里德曼等人的完善,让自私成为了一种美德。 自由市场经济理论的...
评分 评分最近想结合自己的行业写点东西,但读的书少,读政治经济学得东西更少。来这里向各位书友请教。先向各位道声谢谢! 产品的供给,一种模式是政府严格管理,提高标准,人为造成产品高端化,从而导致产品供给的不足,同时政府需要承担不达标产品的监督与检查及欺骗行为。如目前国...
评分最近想结合自己的行业写点东西,但读的书少,读政治经济学得东西更少。来这里向各位书友请教。先向各位道声谢谢! 产品的供给,一种模式是政府严格管理,提高标准,人为造成产品高端化,从而导致产品供给的不足,同时政府需要承担不达标产品的监督与检查及欺骗行为。如目前国...
评分中国的环境面临着从所未有的压力,空气、水和垃圾的问题是环保组织最关心的。就我的观察而言,目前环保组织的争取重点在政府信息的公开与民间组织的的介入,即在外部监督上做文章。 本身不是政治学的科班出身,出于工作的需要和个人的兴趣而阅读这本书,对埃莉诺的思想源流等...
It begins with scenarios and numbers, and needs a lot of logic, so definitely not for bed reading. I gave up after about ten pages.
评分针对公地问题私有化&政府管制外的第三条道路,非常有启发性!(作者是第一位女性诺贝尔经济学奖获得者,🐂🍺
评分CPR
评分classic. 为了thesis读的书,相见恨晚获益匪浅。虽然理论的实践总是面对诸多困难,但至少提供了一种可探索的模式。个人对广泛适用的简单模型不是很感冒,因为通常模型越简单,现实越打脸,所以这种多方考量商量着来留出余地的讨论反而比较合我胃口。
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